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ABSTRACT

Arbitral tribunals have misconstrued the purpose of
internationalinvestment agreements (IIAs) by failing to factor in

the development aspect of these agreements into their analysis.
IAs were constituted to protect foreign investment in order to
promote economic development. However, arbitraltribunalshave

tended to focus mainly on the investorprotection elements of IAs,
leading to impingements on human rights and the environment

and leaving IAs as a threat to sustainabledevelopment.
Drawing from all publicly available investment awards, a
review of these awards found fifty-six awards in which human
rights and environmental issues were implicated in investment
disputes. The review furtherfinds that in many instances arbitral
tribunals downplay or dismiss noneconomic issues, leaving

compromises to both human rights and environmental issues and
constraintson state ability to regulate these areas. Based on the

findings of this review, the Article makes suggestions for how
states can best reform IIAs to help them better align with the
development aspects of these agreements.

* Professor of Law, University College London.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is widely acknowledged that the purpose of international
investment treaties is to help promote and protect foreign investment.1

1.

See, e.g., Siemens A.G. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on

Jurisdiction, 1 81 (Aug. 3, 2004); RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES
OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 67 (2d ed. 2012); JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW
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Yet this description may be incomplete since the protection to foreign

investment afforded by these treaties is also a means of fostering a
state's economic prosperity and economic development. 2 Indeed, many
investment treaties begin with the formal recognition of the role of
3
foreign investment in seeking to improve economic development.
Countless studies have shown that foreign investment is

beneficial for economic development. 4 This is because it can create
employment, generate and disseminate knowledge and technology,

and create spillover effects onto other industries. 5 Moreover, it can
assist "human capital formation, contribute to international trade
integration, help create a more competitive business environment and
6
enhance enterprise development." However, the economic benefits of
7
foreign investment are not automatic. Rather, the magnitude of any

benefit is dependent on the appropriate frameworks or policy tools the
8
host state puts in place to realize these benefits.
International investment agreements are an example of a
framework or policy tool used to realize the benefits of economic
development. In theory, these agreements are designed to attract the
foreign investment necessary to begin paving the way to a country's
economic development. However, countless studies have now proven
the amorphous links between investment treaty conclusion and
attraction of foreign investment. 9 At the same time, investment

OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 1 (2015); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Treaty Interpretationfrom a
Negotiator's Perspective, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 281, 299 n.61 (1989).
See Amco Asia Corp. v. Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Decision on
2.
Jurisdiction, ¶ 23 (Sept. 25, 1983); Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No.
ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, 1¶ 272-73 (Jan. 14, 2010); Saluka
Inv. BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Partial Award, ¶ 300 (Mar. 17, 2006).
See, e.g., Bilateral Investment Agreement for the Protection of Investments,
3.
Colom.-U.A.E., at pmbl., Nov. 12, 2017; Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Guat.-Trin. & Tobago, at pmbl., Aug. 13, 2013.
See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL
4.
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS ON FOREIGN DIRECT INvESTMENT: AN OVERVIEW OF

EMPIRICAL STUDIES 1998-2014 (2014) [hereinafter UNCTAD]; Anis Omria & Bassem
Kahouli, The Nexus Among ForeignInvestment, Domestic Capitaland Economic Growth:
EmpiricalEvidence from the MENA Region, 68 RES. ECONOMY 257, 257 (2014); Cristina
Jude & Gregory Levieuge, Growth Effect of FDI in Developing Economies: The Role of
Institutional Quality, 40 WORLD ECON. 715, 715 (2017); Maha Kalai & Nahed Zghidi,
Foreign Direct Investment, Trade, and Economic Growth in MENA Countries:
EmpiricalAnalysis Using ARDL Bounds Testing Approach, 10 J. KNOWLEDGE ECON.
397, 398 (2017).
See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOR
5.
DEVELOPMENT: MAXIMISING BENEFITS, MINIMISING COSTS 9 (2002) [hereinafter OECD].

Id.
See id. at 25.
See id.
See Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do BilateralInvestment TreatiesAttract FDI?
Only a Bit and They Could Bite, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT
6.
7.
8.
9.

INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES,

DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND
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protections found in these treaties may constrain a host state's ability
to translate investment flows into benefits for the country. 10 In
particular, the provisions of investment treaties may thwart state
efforts to regulate the effects of foreign investment in relation to social
goals, such as those relating to human rights protection and the
environment."1

Given the recognition of these problems, there has been a
movement
towards
reestablishing
international
investment
agreements as a vehicle for promoting sustainable development. 12
Rather than merely an environmental concept as it was originally
envisioned, sustainable development today encompasses concepts of
economics, social, and environmental. 13 Foreign investment, seen
through the lens of sustainable development, thus prizes investment
that maximizes contributions to economic, social, and environmental
development of host countries. 14
Despite the equivocal evidence of foreign investment's positive
contributions to social and environmental development, international
organizations, such as the United Nations and the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), are relying on
private investors to meet the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. 15
As UNCTAD has recently advised, governments should create a
favourable
and enabling
investment
environment
and use
international investment agreements (IIAs) to foster investment to
meet sustainable development goals. 16 However, in doing so, UNCTAD

INvESTMENT FLOwS 350 (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009); Christian Bellak,
Economic Impact of Investment Agreements 20 (Vienna Univ. of Econ. and Bus., Dep't of
Econ. Working Paper No. 200, 2015); Jennifer Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Foreign
Direct Investment and the Business Environment in Developing Countries: The Impact of
Bilateral Investment Treaties 2 (Yale L. Sch., Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Public Pol'y Res.
Paper No. 293, 2005); UNCTAD, supra note 4, at 3.
10.
See OECD, supra note 5, at 7.
11.
But see id. at 172 (noting studies have shown foreign investment reduce
poverty and improve social conditions and workers' rights).
12.
GRO H. BRUNDTLAND, THE REPORT OF THE WORLD
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: OUR COMMON FUTURE 31

COMMISSION ON
(1987) (defining

sustainable development as "development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.").
13.
See Anne van Aaken & Tobias A. Lehmann, Sustainable Development and
International Investment Law: An Harmonious View from Economics, in PROSPECTS IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 318 (Roberto Echandi & Pierre Sauve
eds., 2013); TRACEY STRANGE & ANNE BAYLEY, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: LINKING
ECONOMY, SOCIETY, ENVIRONMENT 25-27 (2005).

&

14.
See generally Karl Sauvant & Howard Mann, Strengthening the Global Trade
and Investment System For Sustainable Development, 2 INT'L CTR. FOR TRADE
SUSTAINABLE DEv. (2017).
15.
See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAM, SDGFFramework of Engagement,

https://www.sdgfund.org/sdgf-framework-engagement
(last visited Jan. 15, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/375Z-NAHD] (archived Jan. 15, 2020).
16.
See UNCTAD Secretariat, Promoting Foreign Investment in the Sustainable
Development Goals, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.II/35, at 3 (Sept. 25, 2017).
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counsels, states should also ensure that they protect public interests
17
States
by "safeguarding policy space for sustainable development."
must therefore find a compromise between using IIAs to foster a
favourable investment climate and ensuring that their use does not
impinge on policy space for protecting sustainable development goals.
This compromise is further complicated by the fact that, although
IIAs are thought to be premised on a grand bargain-the protection of
foreign investment in return for the promise of economic

development

18

-both

IIA agreements themselves, as well as their

interpretation by investment arbitral tribunals, have tended not to
respect this bargain. Rather, they have tended to focus primarily on
protecting foreign investment, while giving little credence to promoting
the economic development side of the bargain.19 Moreover, in myriad

instances, arbitral tribunal interpretations of IIAs have also enabled
foreign investors to impinge on states' policy space for protecting
noneconomic issues. 20 In other words, the foreign investment
protection aspects of the treaties have been heralded, while the

development aspects of them have not.
Yet what if the basic premise behind IIAs has been misconstrued?.
That is, that IIAs were constituted not to protect foreign investment in
exchange for economic development, but rather that the treaties were
promulgated to protect foreign investment in order to promote
economic development. This would argue in favour of a nexus between
investment and development, which would suggest, at a minimum, two
requirements for IIAs and their interpretation. First, IIAs must leave
ample room for states to protect development goals; and second, due to
the interrelated relationship between economic development, social
21
well-being, and the environment, they must ensure that investors
cannot impede social rights or environmental issues. In short, finding
a nexus between investment and development would support the
international
into
development
of sustainable
incorporation
investment law.
This Article argues that not only does a nexus between investment
and development exist but that IIAs, and their interpretation by

arbitral tribunals, do not consistently respect that relationship. As a
result, IIAs are adversely affecting human rights and environmental

Id. at 4.
17.
See Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work: An
18.
Evaluationof BilateralInvestment Treatiesand Their GrandBargain, 6 HARV. INT'L L.J.
67, 77 (2005).
See infra Part I.B.
19.
See id.
20.
See G.A. Res. 64/236, at 2 (Mar. 31, 2010); Ulrich Beyerlin, Sustainable
21.
Development, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (2013).
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issues and curtailing states' regulatory power in relation to these
issues.
This argument will be made in six parts. Part II examines the
nexus between international investment law and development, finding
that the modern era of international investment law has repeatedly
supported economic-and later sustainable-development as an
important component of HAs.
Part III then turns to examine the implications of HAs on
development, focusing on human rights and environmental issues.
Drawing from an empirical review of all publicly available investment
arbitral awards, this Part locates fifty-six awards in which human
rights and environmental issues are implicated. Owing to the small
sample size, it then engages in a textual analysis of these awards to
find that in many instances arbitral tribunals downplay or dismiss
noneconomic issues leaving compromises to both human rights and
environmental issues. Part IV examines whether these findings are
problematic for development given that commentators have argued
that such concerns are overstated.
Part V then looks to define the legal relationship between
international investment law and noneconomic issues while Part VI
examines methods by which states can reform IIAs to better account
for development goals. This latter Part concludes that states must

adopt both substantive and procedural reforms to HAs to better
account for sustainable development goals.

II. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE DEVELOPMENT NEXUS
Historically, foreign investment has been an important objective
for developed countries. In the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries,

developed countries insured diplomatic claims of protection of their
foreign investors' investment abroad with a threat of force, leading to
the concept of gunboat diplomacy. 22 Post-World War II, developed
countries established Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation to protect foreign investment, which, from the 1960s
onward, evolved into bilateral investment treaties.2 3 These offered a
more legalized form of protection for foreign investors. From the
perspective of developed countries, these treaties would be used to
"create a stable international legal framework to facilitate and protect"

22.
See TAYLOR ST. JOHN, THE RISE OF INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION: POLITICS,
LAW, AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 53 (2018); Christopher K. Dalrymple, Politics

and Foreign Investment: The MultilateralInvestment Guarantee and the Calvo Clause,
29 CORNELL INT'L L. REv. 161, 164 (1996); Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Towards a Greater
Depoliticizationof Investment Disputes, 1 ICSID REV. 1, 1-2 (1986).
23. See ANDREW P. NEWCOMBE & LLUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 22-23 (2009); SALACUSE, supra note

1, at 2.
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foreign investments. 24 Developed countries therefore viewed the
foreign investment regime only through the lens of protecting foreign
investment.
Developing countries, conversely, fought developed countries'
efforts to establish hardline rules for the treatment of foreign
investment, asserting their economic independence through the
United Nations. In 1962, the General Assembly passed a resolution
declaring that the right of people and nations "to permanent

sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources" had to be
"exercised in the interest of their national development and of the well25
Developing countries
being of the people of the State concerned."
further sought to establish a new framework for international
economic relations through the 1974 Declaration on the Establishment
26
of a New International Economic Order. The new order was designed
to "eliminate the widening gap between the developed and the

developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating economic and
social development and peace and justice for present and future

generations." 27 While the developed countries rejected the new
economic order, it became clear that the priority for developing
countries in the international economic arena was the furtherance of
their development.
Nevertheless, despite the developed countries' preference to focus
on foreign investment protection, it was the notion of development that
was used to shape the modern legal landscape for foreign investment.

This can be seen in both economic-oriented and development-oriented
international treaties and initiatives, international
agreements, and international investment arbitrations.

investment

A. International Treaties and Initiatives
Even though developed countries focused on protecting foreign
investment, historically, it was development-and more specifically,

the supposed links between foreign investment treaties and economic
characterized the rise of the modern legal
development 28 -that
framework of foreign investment protection. For instance, the

Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States

SALACUSE, supra note 1, at 125.
24.
G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), at 2, U.N. Doc. A/5344 (Dec. 14, 1962).
25.
GA. Res. 3201 (S-VI), at pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-6/3201 (May 1, 1974).
26.
27.
Id.
28.
See, e.g., UNCTAD, supra note 4 (summarizing a number of studies); Bellak,
supra note 9, at 2 (summarizing a number of studies); see also Muthucumaraswamy
Sornarajah, Developing countries in the investment treaty system: A law for need or a law
for greed?, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: BRIDGING THE GAP
46 (Stephan W. Schill et al. eds., 2016).
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and Nationals of other States (ICSID Convention) 2 9-in line with its
association as an umbrella organization of the World Bank-made a
concerted effort to tie foreign investment protection to the promotion
of economic development. 30 Its preamble thus reads: "the need for
international cooperation for economic development, and the role of
private international investment therein." 31 The executive directors of
the ICSID Convention further stressed that the ICSID Convention
"was prompted by the desire to strengthen the partnership between
countries in the cause of economic development." 32
The 1967 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign
Property also recognized "the importance of promoting the flow of
capital for economic activity and development" and the "contribution
which will be made towards this end by a clear statement
of recognised principles relating to the
protection of foreign
property." 33 The 1985 Convention Establishing the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) similarly referenced economic
development.34 The preamble to the MIGA thus noted the need "to
strengthen international cooperation for economic development and to
foster the contribution to such development of foreign investment in
general and private foreign investment in particular." 35
Alongside economic agreements, development agreements have
equally recognized the links between investment and economic
development. For example, Agenda 21 of the UN Conference on
Environment and Development noted the importance of investment for
countries' economic growth to meet sustainable development aims. 36
Similarly, the Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference
on Financing for Development noted the links between a stable
investment climate and respect for property rights and the ability of
business to operate with maximum development impact. 37 The
Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development further
observed the opportunities for sustainable development that
investment flows opened up, 38 while the Doha Declaration on

29.
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 524. [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
30.
See id. at art. 1; Sornarajah, supra note 28, at 53.
31.
ICSID Convention, supra note 29, at pmbl.
32.
See id. at 40.
33.
ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., Resolution of the Council on the Draft
Convention on the Protection of ForeignProperty, OECD/LEGAL/0084, Annex (1967).
34.
Convention Establishing the Multilateral Guarantee Agency, Oct. 11, 1985,
1508 U.N.T.S. 99.
35.
Id. at pmbl.
36.
See U.N. Conference on Environment and Development Agenda 21, ¶ 2.23,
June, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev. I/Vol. I.
37.
See Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for
Development, ¶ 21, Mar. 22, 2002, U.N. Doc. A/AC.257/32.
38.
See Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.199/20 (Sept. 4, 2002).
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Financing for Development specifically recognized that foreign direct
investment is a vital complement to development efforts. 39 More

recently,

the Addis Ababa Action Agenda

noted the important

contribution that foreign investment can make to sustainable
development,4 0 while the idea of investment is replete throughout the

United Nation's Sustainable Development Agenda 2030.41
B. InternationalInvestment Agreements
International investment agreements, themselves, have also
stressed the importance of economic development. Thus, the first
bilateral investment treaty (BIT) concluded by Germany and Pakistan
recognized that the treaty represented an "understanding" between
the two countries that would promote investment and "increase the
42
prosperity of both" countries. Subsequent treaties have gone on to

reference the importance of economic development in the text of the
treaty. 43 Even former President Ronald Reagan noted that US policy
toward international investment had concluded that the international
investment system "provides the best and most efficient mechanism to
44
promote global economic development."

Building on the idea of the importance of economic development,
some free trade and investment treaties have also enveloped goals of
sustainable development within their ambit. For instance, the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Comprehensive
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)
both reference sustainable development or sustainable growth in their

See Doha Declaration on Financing for Development, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc.
39.
A/CONF.212/L.1/Rev.1 (Dec. 9, 2008).
See Third International Conference on Financing for Development, ¶ 45, U.N.
40.
Doc. A/Conf.227/L.1 (July 15, 2015).
See GA Res. 70/1, ¶$ Goal 2.a, Goal 10.b, 67 (Sept. 25, 2015).
41.
See Convention Concerning the Encouragement of Capital Investment and
42.
the Protection of Property, Belg.-Tunis., pmbl., July 15, 1964 (noting how "the
contractual protection of investments is likely to . . . increase prosperity."); Agreement
on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Ger.-Pak., pmbl., Nov.
25, 1959.
See, e.g., Agreement on the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
43.
Investments, pmbl., Alg.-Jordan, Aug. 1, 1996; Treaty Concerning the Encouragement
and Reciprocal Protection of Investment Russ.-U.S., pmbl., June 17, 1992; Agreement
on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Switz.-Uru., pmbl., Oct. 7,
1988; Agreement Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investments, Fr.-Malta, pmbl., Aug. 11, 1976; Agreement Between the Government of
France and The Republic of Tunisia Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and
Protection of Investments, Fr.-Tunis., pmbl., 1963.
Letter of Transmittal 71-118 from Ronald Reagan, President of the U.S., to
44.
U.S. Senate (Mar. 25, 1986) (on file with U.S. Dep't of State).
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preambles. 45 Indeed, the NAFTA and the CPTPP, in addition to the
Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement, refer to
several development goals in their preambles, including creating new
opportunities for economic and social development, improving working
conditions and living standards, enhancing workers' rights, bringing
economic growth and social benefits, and reducing poverty. 46 The
European Free Trade Association (EFTA)-Bosnia and Herzegovina
free trade agreement goes further by incorporating sustainable
development into several elements of the treaty. It, thus, includes
sustainable development as one of the primary objectives of the treaty
(alongside prosperity) and creates a separate obligation for its state
parties to promote the agreement's economic elements in a manner

that contributes to sustainable development. 47
Several modern bilateral investment treaties include notions of
sustainable development within their ambit as well. 48 Tellingly,
several treaties even specify the causal relationship between
investment and sustainable development. 49 For instance, the 2017
Slovakia-Iran BIT specifies that "investment is critical for sustainable
development" and that the parties are "seeking to promote investment
that contributes to the sustainable development." 50 The 2016 MoroccoNigeria BIT elaborates on this relationship by recognizing the
"contribution investment can make to the sustainable development of
the state parties, including the reduction of poverty, increase of
productive capacity, economic growth, the transfer of technology, and
the furtherance of human rights and human development." 51
Yet beyond these references to sustainable development,
primarily only in treaty preambles, some BITs now also impose specific
responsibilities on the investor vis-&-vis sustainable development. For

45.
North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., pmbl., Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFIA]; Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, Mar. 8, 2018 [hereinafter CPTPP].
46.
See Dom. Rep.-Central America Free Trade Agreement, § 2, Aug. 5, 2004, 119
Stat. 462 [hereinafter DR-CAFTA]; NAFTA, supra note 45; CPTPP, supra note 45.
47.
See Free Trade Agreement, European Free Trade Ass'n-Bosn. & Herz. §§
pmbl., arts. 1, 33, June 24, 2013 [hereinafter EFTA-Bosn. & Herz. Agreement].
48.
See, e.g., Agreement on Investment Protection, E.U.-Sing., pmbl., Apr. 4,
2018; Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Arg.U.A.E., pmbl., Apr. 16, 2018; Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, Can.-Burk. Faso, pmbl., Apr. 20, 2015.
49.
See, e.g., Bilateral Investment Treaty, Belr.-India, pmbl., Sept. 24, 2018
[hereinafter Belarus-India BIT]; Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection
of Investments, Switz.-Egypt, pmbl., June 7, 2010; Agreement for the Promotion and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Austria-Kaz., pmbl., January 12, 2010; Agreement
for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment Japan-Papua N.G. pmbl.,
Apr. 26, 2011; Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Rwanda-U.A.E., pmbl., July 11, 2017.
50.
Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment,
Slovk.-Iran, pmbl., Jan. 19, 2016 [hereinafter Slovakia-Iran BIT].
51.
Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, MoroccoNigeria pmbl., Dec., 3, 2016 [hereinafter Morocco-Nigeria BIT].
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instance, some BITs define the term "investment" in terms of its

contribution to sustainable development, suggesting that an
investment's failure to contribute to a country's sustainable
52
development would render it beyond the scope of the BIT. Other
treaties note that investors should "strive to achieve the highest

possible level of contribution to the sustainable development of the
Host State" by endeavouring to contribute to "economic, social and
sustainable
achieving
at
aiming
progress,
environmental
53
development."
Model BITs, which often provide the framework for future
treaties, further echo the importance of the links between foreign
investment and sustainable development. The Dutch Model BIT, for
instance, obliges state parties to promote foreign investment "in such
54
a way as to contribute to the objective of sustainable development."
Similarly, India's Model BIT both aligns investment with sustainable
development, 5 5 but also requires investors to strive to contribute to
objectives, 5 6 a requirement enforceable by the

host state development

host state. 5 7
In addition to referencing sustainable development, some IIAs
also break the concept down and reference its constituent elements, for
instance, through references to human rights and environmental
protection. 58 A number of treaties, for instance, refer to the importance

See, e.g., Belarus-India BIT, supra note 49, at art. 1.4; Slovakia-Iran BIT,
52.
1
supra note 50, at art. 1.2; Morocco-Nigeria BIT, supra note 51, at art. 1.
Agreement on Investment Cooperation and Facilitation, Braz.-Surin., arts.
53.
15.1, 15.2, May 2, 2018; see also Agreement on Investment Cooperation and Facilitation,
Braz.-Malawi, art. 9, 2015; Morocco-Nigeria BIT, supra note 51, at art. 24 (noting
"investors and their investments should strive to make the maximum feasible
contributions to the sustainable development of the Host State and local community ...
.").

54. Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments
(Netherlands Draft Model BIT), art. 6, 2018.
2015,
See Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, pmbl., Dec.
55.
2
2
https://www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/master-image/Model%20Text%20for% 0the%
[https://perma.cc/ZT59-NYQ8]
OIndian%20Bilateral%2OInvestment%20Treaty.pdf
(archived Oct. 25, 2019) [hereinafter India Model BIT].
See id. at art. 12.2.
56.
See id. at art. 8.4.
57.
On human rights and the environment as elements of sustainable
58.
development, see, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment,
Austria-Nigeria, pmbl., Apr. 8, 2013 [hereinafter Austria-Nigeria BIT] (noting
"investment agreements and multilateral agreements on the protection environment,
human rights or labour rights are meant to foster global sustainable development");
Association Agreement, EU-Geor., pmbl., June 16, 2014 (noting that the states "aim to
improve the protection of human health as an essential element for sustainable
development and economic growth").
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of human rights, labour, or the environment in their preambles5 9 or
require states not to lower human rights, labour, or environmental
protection standards in order to encourage foreign investment. 60
However, some treaties delineate more extensive obligations for states.
in these areas. Thus, the EFTA-Bosnia FTA requires its state parties
to strive to facilitate and promote foreign investment beneficial to the
environment, including environmental technologies and sustainable

renewable energy. 6 1
C. InternationalInvestment Arbitrations
Beyond treaties and international initiatives, several arbitral
tribunals have specifically recognized the importance of development
in the investment context. For instance, in Joseph Charles Lemire v.
Ukraine, the tribunal observed that the object and purpose of the IIA
in question was "not to protect foreign investments per se, but as an
aid to the development of the domestic economy." 6 2 Similarly, the
tribunal in AWG Group noted that in treaties, which promote economic
development or economic prosperity, the protection and promotion of
foreign investment "are only a means to that end."6 3
Some tribunals have even defined the concept of investment in
terms of a project's contribution to economic development. The Salini
tribunal, for instance, held that "investment infers ...
contribution to
the economic development of the host State." 64 While few tribunals
have adopted the Salini rationale as a strict criteria for defining an
investment,6 5 some tribunals have been willing to consider a project's

&

59.
See EFTA-Bosn. & Herz. Agreement, supra note 47, at pmbl.; AustriaNigeria BIT, supra note 58, at pmbl.
60.
See Investment Agreement, China-Chile, art. 15, Nov. 18, 2016; Investment
Protection and Promotion Agreement, Can.-C6te d'Ivoire, art. 15, Nov. 30, 2014;
NATA, supra note 45, at ch. 11; Morocco-Nigeria BIT, supra note 51, at art. 15;
Austria-Nigeria BIT, supra note 58, at art. 4-5.
61.
See EFTA-Bosn. & Herz. Agreement, supra note 47, at art. 39.
62.
Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶1 271-73 (Jan. 14, 2010).
63.
AWG Grp. Ltd. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on
Liability, 1 218 (July 30, 2010),
64.
Salini Costruttori SpA & Italstrade SpA v. Morocco, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (July 23, 2001). See also CSOB v. Slovakia,
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 1 64
(May 24, 1999); Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/10, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶ 123 (May 17, 2007); Malaysian Historical Salvors,
SDN, BHD v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Decision on the Application for
Annulment, ¶ 3 (Apr. 16, 2009) (dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen); Patrick
Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on the
Application for Annulment of the Award, ¶ 31 (Nov. 1, 2006).
65.
See, e.g., Alps Fin. v. Slovakia., UNCITRAL Preliminary Redacted Version of
the Award, (Mar. 25, 2011); Casado & Pres. Allende Found. v. Chile, ICSID Case No.
ARB/98/02, Award, ¶ 232 (May 8, 2008) [hereinafter Casado v. Chile); GEA Grp. v.
Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/16, Award, ¶ 314 (Mar. 31, 2011); L.E.S.I. S.p.A.
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contribution to a country's economic development in their overall
analysis of whether it constitutes an investment. 66 Moreover, for
financial-as opposed to physical-investments tribunals have been
more willing to consider their effects on economic development, noting

that such investments should provide a benefit to the host state and
67
support the host state's economic development.
Despite tribunal reluctance to consider economic development as
a strict element of an investment, several tribunals have confirmed the
relationship between foreign investment and economic developments.

As they have observed, economic development

is an "expected

69
of an investment. Moreover, they
consequence" 68 or the objective
have concluded that, in aggregate, the activity of foreign investment
70
should contribute to a host state's economic development. In other
words, even if arbitral jurisprudence does not suggest that economic
development is a criterion for investment, it suggests a relationship
between investment and economic development.
Therefore, from the references to economic development in some
of the founding documents of international investment law and in
treaties and in arbitral case law, it seems apparent that there is a
nexus between international investment law and development. Yet, for
the most part, neither economic development nor sustainable
development concerns inform either the substantive rules on

Astaldi S.p.A. v. Algeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/03, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 72 (July
12, 2006); Gavazzi & Gavazzi v. Romania, Decision on Jurisdiction, Admissibility And
Liability, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/25, ¶ 114 (Apr. 21, 2015); Romak v. Uzbekistan., PCA
Case No. AA280, Award, ¶ 200 (Nov. 26, 2009); Fakes v. Turkey, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/20, Award, 1¶ 110-11 (July 14, 2010).
See, e.g., Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Pakistan, ICSID
66.
Case No. ARB/03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 137 (Nov. 14, 2005); Biwater Gauff Ltd.
v. Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, ¶ 316 (July 24, 2008); Consortium
Groupement L.E.S.I.-DIPENTA v. Algeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/08, Award, ¶ 13(iv)
(Jan. 10, 2005); Inmaris Perestroika Sailing Mar. Serv. Gmbh v. Ukraine, ICSID Case
No. ARB/08/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 132 (Mar. 8, 2010); Phoenix Action Ltd. v.
Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, ¶ 115 (Apr. 15, 2009); see also
Deutsche Bank AG v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/02, ¶ 48 (Oct. 23, 2012)
(dissenting opinion of Judge Khan).
See, e.g., Abaclat v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on
67.
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 374 (Aug. 4, 2011). But see Nova Scotia Power Inc. v.
Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/1, Excerpts of Award, ¶ 130 (Apr. 30, 2014)
(noting a benefit need not amount to economic development, although "a further enquiry
regarding economic development may be appropriate.").
Casado v. Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/02, Award, ¶ 232 (May 8, 2008);
68.
Quiborax & NonMetallic Minerals v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No ARB/06/2, Award, ¶ 222
(Sept. 16, 2015) [hereinafter Quiborax v. Bolivia].
See Capital Fin. Holdings Luxembourg S.A. v. Cameroon, ICSID Case No.
69.
ARB/15/18, Award, ¶ 422 (June 22, 2017).
70. See Igkale Insaat Ltd. $irketi v. Turkmenistan., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/24,
Award, ¶ 291 (Mar. 8, 2016).
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investment protection or the interpretation of these rules. Instead,
both investment rules and their interpretation have tended to focus on
investor's property protection rights.

III. IMPINGING ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

Having located a nexus between foreign investment and economic,
or sustainable, development, gives further credence to the argument
that foreign investment should contribute to economic or sustainable
development. Indeed, at a minimum the nexus between foreign
investment and economic or sustainable development suggests that
foreign investment should not impinge on a state's development goals.
To be sure, a state's development goals may be myriad, but at their
core they must ensure that they enable individuals to enjoy their
human rights. 71 Moreover, this will also implicate environmental
issues insofar as there is a human right to a healthy environment as
well as through the close links between human and environmental
rights.72
A review of investment arbitration cases confirms that there have
been a number of instances where human rights or environmental
issues have been implicated in foreign investment matters, which have
not consistently promoted a state's development goals. This can be seen
from a brief empirical analysis of such awards as well as by reviewing
the text of the awards themselves.
A. EmpiricalAnalysis
Drawing from all publicly 73 available investment arbitration
awards, a review of these cases located fifty-six arbitral awards in
which human rights or environmental issues were implicated. 74 An
award was characterized
as involving a human rights or
environmental issue if the state or amicus curiae argued that such an

71.

For arguments on the links between economic development and human

&

rights, see A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRILS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL PROTEcTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
14-15 (1996); JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 234
(3d ed., 2013); WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE
WORLD BANK vii (1998); Dominic McGoldrick, Sustainable Development and Human
Rights: An Integrated Conception, 45 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 796, 796-97 (1996).
72.
See generally THE HUMAN RIGHT TO A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT (John Knox

Ramin Pejan eds., 2018).
73.
Not all investment arbitral awards are made public. Consequently, the
reviewed cases likely do not represent the entirety of investment arbitral awards dealing
with human rights or environmental issues. See infra Appendix 1.
74.
This does not include those cases involving human rights/environmental
issues that were settled or discontinued. See infra Appendix 1.
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issue was present in the dispute. 76 Awards were selected from
scholarly literature and discussion as well as through keyword
searches of "human rights" and "environment," along with mapping
76
Since the aim was to
features, on two investment law databases.
determine whether IIAs were infringing on a state's development, the
review did not focus on human rights or environmental complaints
raised by investors77 nor on awards at the jurisdiction stage in which

the noneconomic issue was peripheral. 78 The cutoff date for the reviews
was December 2018, and the reviewed awards spanned between 1992
and 2018.79
Although the small sample size does not support the drawing of
determinative conclusions, it may suggest trends in this area. For
instance, the surveyed cases suggested that human rights or
environmental issues were, from the state's perspective, implicated in
a number of different areas. These included: the right to water, the
right to health, the right to a healthy environment, environmental
issues, indigenous rights, the right to culture, and social issues

stemming from an economic crisis. 80
Tribunals tended to treat these issues in a number of different
ways. In the surveyed cases, the most common treatment by tribunals

This excluded cases in which the background of the case may have involved a
75.
human rights or environmental issue but the subject matter of the arbitration involved
other grounds. For instance, Chevron v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23 (2012) was not
included in the review, despite initially raising environmental issues, as the subject
matter of the arbitration focused on the investor's treatment in the Ecuadorian
judicial/administrative processes. Similarly, arbitrations involving state regulatory
changes for reasons other than human rights or environmental reasons were excluded.
For this reason, the Energy Charter treaty arbitrations against Spain, and other
countries, were excluded despite alternative energy projects being an environmental
issue.
These included Investment Arbitration Reporter and Investor State Law
76.
Guide. To limit selection bias, an award selected from one method was doubled checked
against the other to confirm it involved a human rights or environmental issue.
See Daniel Behn & Malcolm Langford, Trumping the Environment? An
77.
Empirical Perspective on the Legitimacy of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 18 J. WORLD
INV. & TRADE 14, 15 (2017) (discussing environmental awards involving investors); Silvia
Steininger, What's Human Rights Got To Do With It? An EmpiricalAnalysis of Human
Rights References in Investment Arbitration, 31 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 33, 42 (2018)
(discussing human rights awards involving investors).
For instance, awards dealing with environmental issues which were
78.
dismissed at the jurisdiction stage for reasons unconnected to the environmental issues
were not considered. See, e.g., Commerce Grp. Corp. & San Sebastian Gold Mines, Inc.
v. El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/17, Award, 1 115 (Mar. 14, 2011); Corona
Materials LLC v. Dominican Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/14/3, Award, ¶ 270 (31
May 2016); Renco Grp., Inc. v. Peru, Partial Award on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No.
UTNCT/13/1, Award, ¶ 152 (July 15, 2016).
For the data set, see infra Appendix 1.
79.
The awards are characterized by the nature of non-economic right in
80.
Appendix 1. See infra Appendix 1.
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was to acknowledge the noneconomic issue before disregarding or
discounting it in its analysis.81 Several tribunals also disregarded the
issue entirely, almost from the outset, 82 or sidestepped it by focusing

its analysis on other issues, in some cases deliberately. 8 3 However, in
a sign of potential promise, almost one out of every five tribunals
explicitly engaged with the noneconomic issues in its analysis; that is,
the tribunal specifically acknowledged the noneconomic right in
question and then included the right in its legal analysis. 84 While this
did not necessarily always translate into absolving the state of all
liability, it tended to contribute to a reduction of damages imposed on

the state for breaches of its obligations. 85 Tribunal engagement with
noneconomic issues also tended to be greater where a health issue was
involved, 86 in more recent disputes, 87 or where the state filed a

81.
See, e.g., SAUR Int'l S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/04/4, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 330 (June 6, 2012) (acknowledging the state's right to
protect human rights but noting that such protection must be combined with respect for
investor rights); Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 51 (Aug. 3, 2006) [hereinafter Suez v.
Argentina]; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Jurisdiction, 1 262 (May 16, 2006) (noting that
Argentina is subject to human rights obligation but finding that those obligations are
not inconsistent with its investment treaty obligations).
82.
See, e.g., Azurix Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/01/12, Award, ¶ 261
(July 14, 2006) (the matter of human rights "has not been fully argued and the Tribunal
fails to understand the incompatibility in the specifics of the instant case); CMS Gas
Transmission Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 121 (May 12, 2005)
[hereinafter CMS v. Argentina] (noting there is no question of affecting fundamental
human rights when considering the issues disputed by the parties).
83.
See, e.g., Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, UNCITRAL Award, ¶ 8 (June 8,
2009) ("...the decision in this proceeding has been awaited by ... entities concerned with
environmental regulation [and] indigenous peoples . . . These issues were extensively
argued in this case and considered by the Tribunal. However, given the Tribunal's
holdings, the Tribunal is not required to decided many of [these] issues .... ").
84.
See, e.g., Al Tamimi v. Oman, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/33, Award, 1 448 (Nov.
3, 2015); Aven v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/3, Award, ¶ 762 (Sept. 18, 2018);
Cortec Mining Kenya v. Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/29, Award, ¶¶ 395-96 (Oct. 22,
2018) [hereinafter Cortec v. Kenya]; Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Lithuania, ICSID
Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, ¶ 465 (Sept. 11, 2007) [hereinafter Parkerings v. Lithuania];
Philip Morris Brands Sarl v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 129 (July 8,
2016) [hereinafter Philip Morris v. Uruguay]; Urbaser S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/26, Award, ¶ 325 (Dec. 8, 2016); see also infra Part II.B.
85.
Compare Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶
320 (Sept. 5, 2008) (recognizing the social issues Argentina faced stemming from its
economic crisis of USD 2.8 million), with Nat'l Grid PLC v. Argentina, UNCITRAL
Award, ¶ 390 (Nov. 3, 2008) (failing to recognize social issues stemming from economic
crisis and awarded USD 54 million).
86.
See infra Part II.B.2 for a discussion.
87.
See, e.g., Aven v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/3, Award, ¶ 39 (Sept.
18, 2018); Cortec v. Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/29, Award, ¶ 38 (Oct. 22, 2018);
Philip Morris v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 56 (July 8, 2016); Urbaser
v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award, ¶ 32 (Dec. 8, 2016).
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counterclaim alleging that the investor had breached a human right or
88
environmental obligation.
From the surveyed cases, the most common alleged breaches of
the investment treaty related to fair and equitable treatment (FET)
and expropriation. In just under two-thirds of the examined cases, the
89
tribunals found a violation of either or both of these obligations. FET
was, however, the more successful basis for a claim as more than half
the awards involved a finding of a breach of FET, while tribunals found
90
an expropriation in just under 30 percent of the awards.
Damage awards in these cases were also often significant, ranging

from USD $2.1 million to $1.2 billion. 91 In addition, human rights or
environmental issues in investment disputes weighed more heavily on
developing, rather than developed or emerging economies. The vast
proportion of the cases were instigated against a developing economy
92
country with Argentina being the most frequent defendant state.

However, several cases were also brought against developed economies
93
with Canada being the most frequent defendant in this group.
Much commentary has been devoted to the identity characteristics
of arbitrators. 94 However, from the small number of surveyed cases,
there was no indication that a particular identity group seemed to be
more prone to taking into account human rights or environmental
issues into their analysis. 95 Nevertheless, arbitrators with a

See, e.g., Aven v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/3, Award, ¶ 8 (Sept.
88.
18, 2018); Burlington Res. Inc. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on
Counterclaims, ¶ 52 (Feb. 7, 2017); Perenco v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6,
Interim Decision On The Environmental Counterclaim, ¶ 34 (Aug. 11, 2015); Urbasery.
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award, 1 115 (Dec. 8, 2016).
Thirty-five out of fifty-six awards involved a finding of a breach of fair and
89.
equitable treatment or expropriation or both. See infra Appendix 1 for the awards.
Twenty-nine out of fifty-six cases involved a finding of a breach of FET while
90.
sixteen out of fifty-six awards found a breach of expropriation. See infra Appendix 1 for
the awards.
See infra Appendix 1 for a list of damages awarded in each surveyed
91.
arbitration.
Forty-one out of fifty-six cases were against a developing country: Barbados,
92.
Argentina, Tanzania, Uruguay, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Mexico, Ecuador, Venezuela,
Kenya, Zimbabwe, Peru, Egypt, Chile, and Mongolia. See infra Appendix 1.
Canada was the defendant in one-quarter of all the cases brought against
93.
developed countries. See infra Appendix 1.
See Susan D. Franck et al., The Diversity Challenge: Exploring the "Invisible
94.
College" of InternationalArbitration, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 429, 429 (2015); Gus
van Harten, Leaders in the Expansive and Restrictive Interpretation of Investment
Treaties:A Descriptive Study of ISDSAwards to 2010,29 EUR. J. INT'L L. 507, 509 (2018).
It is difficult to conclusively determine the influence of female arbitrators or
95.
developing economy arbitrators given the small sample size. There were only three
female arbitrators in the 56 awards reviewed and approximately one-third of the
arbitrators came from a developing economy country. However, the awards in which
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background as a university professor 96 or as a judge 97 appeared to give
more credence to human rights or environmental issues than
arbitrators with a strictly commercial background.

B. Textual Analysis
While the empirical examination of the awards was limited by its
small sample size, many of the trends the review suggests are
supported by a deeper examination into the awards themselves.
Indeed, a closer look at some of these arbitral disputes confirms the
impact of IIAs on noneconomic rights as well as, in some cases, the
tribunal's dismissive attitude or reluctance towards dealing with such
issues. These can be discerned from a review of cases involving the
right to water, the right to health, and environmental issues.
1. The Right to Water

As early as 2007, the United Nations (UN) recognized the human
rights implications of international investment treaties relating to the
right to water. At that time, the UN Commissioner on Human Rights

noted that current investor-state disputes between private water
companies
draw attention to the potential impact that obligations arising from bilateral
investment treaties can have on the duty of States to regulate companies in the
context of private provision of water or sanitation services. It remains unclear
whether and how the obligations of Governments under international human
rights instruments will be taken into account [in these contexts].98

After

seven

water-related

investment

disputes,

99 the UN

Commissioner's concerns remain, since in most instances tribunals

tribunals thoroughly engaged with human rights or environmental issues were not
composed of more women or developing economy arbitrators. See infraAppendix 1.
96.
See, e.g., Aven v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/3, Award, ¶ 39 (Sept.
18, 2018); Philip Morris v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, 1 18 (July 8,
2016); Urbaser v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award, ¶ 9 (Dec. 8, 2016).
97.
See, e.g., Aven v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/3, Award, 1 39 (Sept.
18, 2018); Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 11 (Sept. 5,
2008); Parkerings v. Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, ¶ 17 (Sept. 11, 2007).
98.
U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights on the scope and content of the relevant human rights
obligations related to equitable access to safe drinking water and sanitation under
international human rights instruments, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/6/3, ¶ 63 (Aug. 16, 2007).
99.
See Azurix Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/01/12, Award, 1 39 (July
14, 2006); Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, ¶ 33 (July
24, 2008); CompaniA de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/97/3, Award, 1 1.1 (Aug. 20, 2007); Impregilo SpA v. Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/17, Award, ¶ 1 (June 21, 2011); SAUR Int'l S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/04/4, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability (June 6, 2012); Suez, Sociedad General
de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on
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have failed to effectively engage with the right to water when pitted
against an investor's rights. In part, tribunal reluctance to engage with
right-to-water issues may be because, as one tribunal suggested, the

1 00 Although in
state did not "fully argue" the human rights at issue.

another case, where the state argued that its actions were driven by
the need to guarantee its inhabitants the human right to water, the
tribunal still ignored the issue entirely.101

Even in disputes in which both states and amici curiae extensively
elaborated on the right to water, there has been little integration of
human rights issues into tribunal analysis. Thus, in Biwater v.

Tanzania, amici curiae contended that investor responsibility had to
be "assessed in the context of sustainable development and human

rights." 0 2 While the tribunal noted that the amici's observations were
03
"useful" and would be used to inform their analysis,1 their written
reasoning failed to make any explicit mention of any of the arguments

raised by the amici.
Similarly, in the Suez v. Argentina arbitrations, Argentina argued

in both disputes that the tribunal's determination of breach of any
treaty provisions should be contextualized and informed by the right
to water.1 04 These arguments were supported in one of the arbitrations
by amici curiae who argued that the right to water was linked to other
human rights, such as the right to human health, and that human

rights obligations required Argentina to take measures "to ensure
access to water by the population, including physical and economic
access."' 0 5
Despite these arguments, the tribunal concluded that Argentina's
human rights obligations neither superseded its investment treaty

obligations nor gave it the authority to take actions in contravention of

Jurisdiction, ¶ 1 (July 30, 2010); Urbaser v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26,
Award, ¶ 34 (Dec. 8, 2016).
100. Azurix Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/01/12, Award, 1 261 (July 14,
2006).
101. Impregilo v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Award, ¶ 228 (June 21,

2011).
102. Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, 1¶ 379, 387
(July 24, 2008).
103. Id. at ¶ 392.
104. See Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Liability, ¶ 232 (July 30, 2010) [hereinafter Suez I v.
Argentina]; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. & Interagua Servicios
Integrales de Agua S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability,
1 252 (July 30, 2010) [hereinafter Suez II v. Argentina].
105. Suez II v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, ¶ 256
(July 30, 2010).
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its investment treaty obligations.1 0 6 Instead, it held that Argentina
was subject to both its human rights and investment treaty obligations,
that these obligations were "not inconsistent, contradictory, or
mutually exclusive" and that Argentina should have respected both
sets of obligations. 107 Thus, although the tribunal recognized
Argentina's human rights obligations, it did not use this recognition to
integrate these rights into its analysis.
Tribunal acknowledgement of the relevant human rights before
discounting its relevance is also apparent in SAUR v. Argentina.108 In
that dispute, Argentina .argued that its investment treaty obligations
should be read in harmony with its human rights obligations, in
particular the right to water. 0 9 The tribunal agreed in part, finding
that human rights, and the right to water in particular, were part of
the various sources it should take into account in resolving this
dispute. 110 However, it found that the state's right to protect human
rights is not absolute and must be combined with respect for the rights
and guarantees granted to the foreign investor."' The tribunal thus

concluded that it needed to balance these two principles.11 2 Yet after
its initial acknowledgement of the right to water, the tribunal failed to
mention it in its subsequent analysis, and it is unclear where, if ever,
the right to water informs the tribunal's thinking or where it balances
the right to water against investor rights.
Conversely, in Urbaserv. Argentina,113 which once again involved
a water concession contract in Argentina, the tribunal made a
concerted effort, for the first time, to address Argentina's human rights
obligations relating to the right to water.11 4 The tribunal determined
that the investor's claim to fair and equitable treatment had to be

assessed in light of the high "measure of deference that international
law generally extends to the right of domestic authorities to regulate
matters within their own borders."11 5 It also found that an investor's
legitimate expectations should be assessed within the context of the
host state's economic and social environment and its "leeway" to issue
public interest regulations.116

106. See Suez I v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Liability, ¶
240 (July 30, 2010); Suez II v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on
Liability, ¶ 262 (July 30, 2010).
107. Id.
108. SAUR Int'l S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/4, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Liability (June 6, 2012).
109. See id. at 1 328
110. See id. at 1 330.
111. See id.
112. See id. at ¶ 332.
113. Urbaser v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award (Dec. 8, 2016).
114. See id. at ¶ 1220.
115. Id. at ¶ 594.
116. See id.
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More importantly, the tribunal noted that Argentina had a
responsibility "to ensure the population's health and access to water
and to take all measures required to that effect." 117 It further
stipulated how Argentina's human rights obligations interacted with
its investment treaty obligations, noting that the state's measures to
protect the right to water could not "hurt the fair and equitable
treatment standard because their occurrence must have been deemed
to be accepted by the investor when entering into the investment ....

In short, they were expected to be part of the investment's legal
framework."1 18
The tribunal's considerations of Argentina's human rights
obligations, however, may have been prompted by the state's
counterclaim in which it claimed that the investors had failed to meet

119
While the
their human rights obligations relating to water services.

tribunal ultimately dismissed the counterclaim on the grounds that the
investor was not obliged "to perform services complying with the
12 0
it
residents' human right to access to water and sewage services,"
concluded that investors have obligations not to engage in activity
aimed at destroying human rights. 121

2. The Right to Health
As with the right to water, the idea that investment treaties may

constrain a state's health obligations vis-&-vis its citizenry is well
established. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health has
investment agreements impose
observed that "[i]nternational

obligations on States vis-A-vis investors that may affect States' power
to introduce health laws in the public interest. States may have to
modify their laws to accommodate investors' rights, even though such:;
modifications may increase the risk of violating individuals' right to

health." 122
An early example of the accommodations the Special Rapporteur

12 3
is alluding to can be seen in Ethyl v. Canada. The dispute involved
ban
to
attempts
Canada's
challenging
investor
the
methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl (MMT), known to

117. Id. at ¶ 622.
118. Id.
119. See id. at ¶ 1156.
120. See id. at ¶¶ 1207-10.
121. See id. at 1 1199.
122. U.N. Secretary-General, Right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health, ¶ 53, U.N. Doc. A/69/299 (Aug. 11,
2014).
123. See Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim
to Arbitration, ¶1 5-6 (Sept. 10, 1996).
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contain a neurotoxin. 124 After losing its jurisdictional challenge,
Canada settled with the investor, agreeing to reverse the ban and issue
an official statement that it did not have any evidence that MMT
caused harm.1 2 5 Notably, other countries, including the United States,
the EU, and China, continue to prohibit or limit MMT for health
reasons.126
However, in other investment arbitrations, tribunals have
recognized the importance of a state's interest in protecting health
issues, although such recognition has not always factored into the
tribunal's analysis. For instance, in S.D. Myers v. Canada,12 7 the state
banned the transboundary export of PCB1 28 waste to prevent possible
impairment to human life or health. 129 Although the tribunal
acknowledged the health risks associated with the transboundary
movement of hazardous waste, it found that Canada should have used

a less trade restrictive measure to fulfil its health objectives.1 30
Similarly, in Achmea B.V. v. Slovak Republic, 131 where an
investor sued the state after it changed the private health regulations
in order to facilitate universal health coverage, 132 the tribunal

acknowledged the state's need to protect the right to health. As it
observed, the investment treaty is not "hostile towards particular
polices on the provision of health care facilities."1 33 Nevertheless, the
tribunal concluded that a state is obliged to compensate investors for
efforts to increase health care protection.1 3 4
Conversely, in Methanex v. USA, 135 the tribunal made great
strides in establishing jurisprudence confirming the importance of a
state's right to regulate health issues in the face of its investment
obligations. The dispute involved the state banning the investor's
investment for health reasons. However, the tribunal found that such
a regulation enacted for a public purpose, which is nondiscriminatory
and enacted with due process, can affect a foreign investment without

124.
125.

JAMES P. WINTER, LIES THE MEDIA TELL Us 86 (2007).
See
APPLETON
&
ASSOcIATES,
Ethyl
Corporation

v.
Canada,
http://www.appletonlaw.com/files/cases_ethyl.pdf
(last visited Oct.
25,
2019)
[https://perma.cc/M243-ZCY7] (archived Oct. 25, 2019).
126. Ray Minjares, Update: MMT, INT'L COUNCIL ON CLEAN TRANSP. (Feb, 16,
2012), https://theicct.org/blog/stafflupdate-mmt [https://perma.cc/4439-DT25] (archived
Oct. 25, 2019).
127. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award (Nov. 13, 2000)
[hereinafter SDMI v. Canada].
128. PCB refers to polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) chemicals. See id. at T¶ 90-100
129. See id. at ¶ 123.
130. See id. at ¶ 215.
131. Achmea B.V. v. Slovakia, PCA Case No. 2008-13 (Dec. 7, 2012).
132. See id. at ¶ 108.
133. Id. at ¶ 294.
134. See id. (suggesting that the decision would have been if investors have been
compensated for their efforts in increasing healthcare protection).
135. Methanex Corp. v. United States, UNCITRAL, Final Award (Aug. 3, 2005).
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36
While the
constituting an expropriation or triggering compensation.1
tribunal did not refer to the right to health per se, it noted that the
investor had entered a market in which comparable investments were
commonly restricted for health reasons, and that the regulation in
question, and the scientific studies confirming the health risks upon
37
which it was based, were objectively confirmed.1
In Chemtura v. Canada, the tribunal echoed the reasoning in
Methanex.138 The dispute involved a governmental regulatory review

and eventual phaseout of lindane, a pesticide, and the state specifically

139
invoked its right to regulate to protect public health issues.
The tribunal confirmed the reasoning in Methanex that public
policy measures taken in a nondiscriminatory manner were not

compensable, noting that Canada's acts in this dispute were
"motivated by the increasing awareness of the dangers presented by
40
lindane for human health.".1 The importance of protecting health also
seemed to underlie the tribunal's analysis as it observed that its review
of Canada's regulatory actions operated within the "broader factual

context"141 of the numerous countries that had banned or limited the
142
use of lindane based on health concerns.
In Eli Lilly v. Canada,the dispute involved pharmaceutical giant
Eli Lilly challenging Canada's patent laws. 143 As Canada argued,
patent laws play a particularly relevant role in the pharmaceutical
industry because they protect new and useful inventions and prevent
major pharmaceutical corporations from using their deep pockets to
patent "whole stables of chemical compounds" for unrealized purposes
in hopes that one or more of those compounds will "serendipitously
44
turn out to be useful."1 This promotes innovation and ensures that

136. See id. at pt. 4, ch. D, 1 7 (explaining that as a matter of international law, a
non-discriminatory regulation for a public purpose is expropriatary and compensable if
specific commitments were given by the regulating government that it would not
regulate).
137. Id. at pt. 4, ch. D, 11 9, 14.
138. Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Award (Aug. 2, 2010).
139. Id. at T 183.
140. Id. at T 266.
141. See id. at ¶ 137 (noting that the factual context of lindane's danger was
relevant in the tribunal's analysis).
142. Id. at ¶ 135.
143. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Final Award (Mar. 16,
2017).
144. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Canada's
Statement of Defence, ¶ 19 (June 30, 2014) (explaining policy reasons for Canada's
protection of its patent system).
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patented products, including pharmaceuticals, actually deliver a
particular level or type of utility. 145
In dismissing all of the investor's claims, the tribunal found that
Canada's patent laws had a legitimate public policy, in particular that

the public received their end of the patent bargain, especially in
connection with patents for the new use of a known compound.1 4 6
Moreover, it found that this legitimate public policy was rationally
connected to Canada's patent laws. 14 7 The tribunal therefore deferred
to Canada's approach to regulating patents for pharmaceutical

products, even while noting that Canada's approach may not have been
the preferred one. 14 8

In another pharmaceutical-related dispute, Poland was held liable
for failing to renew the marketing authorizations for two of the
investor's pharmaceutical products. 149 Poland argued that it had
denied the marketing authorizations on the grounds of public

health.

150 The tribunal, while deferring to Poland's right to regulate in

the public interest,1 5 1 concluded that Poland's regulatory measures
were discriminatory, disproportionate in nature, and not a matter of
public necessity. 152 As a result, it concluded that Poland was liable for
expropriation. 153 However, because the award's reasoning on public
health is heavily redacted, it is impossible to definitively conclude
whether Poland's right to protect its nationals' right to health was
adequately considered by the tribunal.

Perhaps the most well-known health related investment
arbitrations are those relating to tobacco-control measures. Tobacco
giant Philip Morris challenged state measures to regulate tobacco
usage in investment arbitrations against both Australia and Uruguay.
While the Australian case was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds,1 54
the Uruguay case proceeded to a decision on its merits.1 55 In Philip

Morris v. Uruguay, the investor challenged Uruguay's tobacco-control
measures,

including the single

presentation requirement,

which

145. See id. at $ 13, 21 (explaining that creation and protection of utility is the
basis for Canada's patent system and, therefore, the benchmark against which
inventions are judged).
146. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Final Award, ¶ 423
(Mar. 16, 2017) (accepting respondent's claim that public receives its end of the bargain).
147. Id.
148. Id. 1 428 (declining to decide whether Canada's approach is the preferred one,
but concluding that the approach is not irrational).
149. Les Laboratoires Servier, S.A.A. v. Poland, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 570 (Feb.
14, 2012).
150. See id. at ¶ 283 (claimant asserts that Poland denied marketing authorization
on public health grounds).
151. Id. ¶ 569.
152. Id. 1 575.
153. See id. at 1 574 (finding divestment).
154. Philip Morris Asia, Ltd. v. Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12,
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Dec. 17, 2015).
155. Philip Morris v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award (July 8, 2016).
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prevented tobacco companies from marketing more than one type of
cigarette per brand family, 156 and the 80/80 Regulation, which
increased the size of prescribed health warnings on cigarette packages
57
leaving less room for trademarks, logos, and other information.1
In dismissing all of the investor's claims, the tribunal made some
important inroads in enlarging the right to health in the context of
investment disputes. The tribunal noted that the expropriation
provisions of an IIA must be interpreted in light of any relevant rules
of international law, including customary international law, and that
the protection of public health is well recognized as an essential
58
manifestation of state police powers.1 It further found that Uruguay's
measures were "adopted in fulfilment of [its] national and
59
international legal obligations for the protection of public health,"1

as the measures were proportionate to the objective they meant to
achieve and were a "potentially effective means to protecting public
health."1 60 Moreover, since the measures were adopted in good faith
and were nondiscriminatory, the tribunal concluded that these
measures were a valid exercise of Uruguay's police powers and
therefore could not constitute an expropriation.161
Similarly, in analysing the investor's claim for fair and equitable
treatment, the tribunal infused its analysis with references to public
health. For instance, it found that the measures were not arbitrary
because they were a useful means to protect public health and there
62
The tribunal also
was ample evidence of health risks of cigarettes.1

held that the concept of the margin of appreciation should be applicable
to claims arising under investment treaties, specifically noting "[t]he
responsibility for public health measures rests with the government
and investment tribunals should pay great deference to governmental
judgments of national needs in matters such as the protection of public

health."1 63
The tribunal went on to note that states should be given deference
in exercising the discretionary exercise of their sovereign power so long
64
as the power was not being exercised irrationally or in bad faith.1
Indeed, the sole inquiry for the tribunal should be limited to whether

156. Id. at ¶ 10.
157. Id. at ¶ 11.
158. Id. at ¶¶ 290-91.
159. Id. at ¶ 302.
160. Id. at ¶ 306.
161. Id. at 1¶ 306-07.
162. See id. at 11 391-92 (recognizing that Uruguayan measures are an effective
means of protecting public health, and noting the existence of evidence indicating health
risks).
163. Id. at 1 399.
164. Id.
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there was a manifest lack of reasons for the legislation.1 65 Moreover,
they found that "substantial deference" should be given to a state's
"decisions as to the measures which should be taken to address an
acknowledged and major public health problem," while the
reasonableness of a particular measure should be "assessed based on
the situation prevailing at the time it was adopted." 166
The tribunal further found that an investor's legitimate
expectations could not be violated by a state's exercise of its normal
regulatory power in the pursuance of a public interest unless specific
undertakings were given.1 67 This would hold even if the regulation
"breaks new ground," provided it has a rational basis and is
nondiscriminatory. 168 As the tribunal observed, Uruguay enjoys
"unquestionable and inalienable rights to protect the health of its
citizens," and it is within this framework to protect public health that
Uruguay has the authority to act to enact tobacco-control measures. 169
3. Environmental Issues
A third area in which investment law has impinged on
noneconomic rights concerns the environment. Indeed, there are
numerous links between human rights and the environment.
Protection of the environment can have knock-on effects on related
human rights, such as the right to health, the right to water, the right
to an adequate standard of living, as well as other rights.
As with the early investment arbitrations relating to health,
tribunals have been reluctant to accept the environmental dimensions
of investment arbitrations. In Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, for instance,
the state expropriated the investor's land by expanding the boundaries
of a national park. 170 The reason for the park's expansion was to
"maintain stable populations of large feline species such as pumas and
jaguars" and to preserve "flora and fauna of great scientific,
recreational, educational, and tourism value, as well as beaches that
are especially important as spawning grounds for sea turtles."171 In
determining the amount of compensation owed to the investor for the
taking, the tribunal held that the environmental purpose for the taking

165. Id.
166. Id. at ¶¶ 417-18.
167. Id. at ¶¶ 422-23.
168. Id. at ¶ 430 ("Article 3.2 of the BIT does not preclude governments from
enacting novel rules, even if these are in advance of international practice, provided
these have some rational basis and are not discriminatory.").
169. Id. ¶ 432.
170. Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No.
ARB/96/1, Final Award (Feb. 17, 2000).
171. Id. at ¶ 18.
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of the property did not "alter the legal character of the taking for which

adequate compensation must be paid." 172 It continued:
Expropriatory environmental measures-no matter how laudable and beneficial
to society as a whole-are, in this respect, similar to any other expropriatory
measures that a state may take in order to implement its policies: where property
is expropriated, even for environmental purposes, whether domestic or
173
international, the state's obligation to pay compensation remains.
74
Marion Unglaube v. CostaRica1 involved a very similar dispute
to Santa Elena as it once again involved a situation in which Costa
Rica expropriated the investor's land to create a national park,
although this time it was for the purpose of protecting and nurturing
175
As with Santa Elena, the
the regeneration of the leatherback turtle.
of the taking was not
purpose
environmental
the
tribunal held that
Costa Rica had the
although
that
concluded
and
relevant to the dispute
right to expropriate property for a bona fide public purpose,
compensation was still due.1 76 However, in a muted sign of promise,

the tribunal did note that Costa Rica should be given deference to
1 77
and that the compensation owed to the
regulate public policy issues
environmental
of
light
in
calculated
be
should
investor
78
considerations.1
Tribunal recognition of environmental issues did not fare much
79
better in Metalclad v. Mexico.1 In that case, Mexico prevented the
investor from operating its hazardous waste landfill by denying it a
permit to do so for, among other reasons, "ecological concerns regarding
the environmental effect and impact" of the hazardous waste landfill
site. 180 The investor's ability to operate the hazardous waste landfill
facility also became permanently precluded when the state issued an
ecological decree protecting rare cacti around the land encompassing
the landfill site.181
The tribunal concluded that Mexico had expropriated the
investor's property by denying it the permit to operate the facility,

172.
173.
174.
2012).
175.
176.
177.

Id. at IT 71-72.
Id. at ¶ 72.
Marion Unglaube v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/1, Award (May 16,
Id. at ¶ 199.
Id. at ¶ 205.
Id. at ¶ 246.

178. Id. at ¶ 309; see also PIERRE-MARIE DUPUY & JORGE E. VINUALES,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 466 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2d ed. 2018)

(viewing the Unglaube award more optimistically).
179. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (Aug. 30,
2000).
180. Id. at 1 92.
181. Id. at ¶ 59.
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despite its concern of the project's adverse environmental effects, as
well as the enactment of the ecological decree preserving the cacti. 182
In coming to this conclusion, the tribunal found that it was not required
to decide or consider the motivation or intent behind the adoption of
the ecological decree protecting the cactus, even though the passage of
the decree, alone, constituted an expropriation. 18 3
In S.D. Myers v. Canada, referred to above in the context of the
right to health, the tribunal specifically referred to the environmental
dimensions of the case. 1 84 More specifically, the tribunal referenced
both the environmental agreements signed by the parties as well as
the NAFTA side agreement on the environment. 185 However, the
tribunal concluded that a state could only use a measure to protect the
environment that is "most consistent with open trade."1 86

Environmental issues, alongside health issues, were also at issue
in Tecmed v. Mexico.1 8 7 In the context of deciding whether the denial
to grant the investor a permit to run a hazardous waste landfill
constituted an expropriation, the tribunal observed that the
"government's intention is less important than the effects of the
measures on the owner of the assets." 188 Furthermore, it concluded
that regulatory administrative actions, such as environmental
protection measures, could be included within the scope of

expropriatory acts even if they are beneficial to society as a whole.1 8 9
In Bilcon v. Canada, the majority of the tribunal similarly failed
to accord much attention to environmental issues. 190 Canada
highlighted the environmental dimensions involved in the dispute
from the outset, noting that the location of the investment was in an
internationally recognized "extremely productive ecosystem with
diverse plant and marine life," a breeding ground for five types of
whales, a nationally recognized wildlife and migratory bird area, and
a UNESCO designated biosphere reserve. 191 It was thus, not
surprising, that the project was subject to an environmental
assessment, known as the Joint Review Panel (JRP).19 2 The scope of

182. Id. at IT 106, 109-10.
183. Id. at ¶ 111.
184. See, e.g., SDMI v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award (Nov. 13, 2000).
185. Id. at ¶ 205-20.
186. Id. at ¶¶ 193-95, 221 (finding that Canada's action were motivated by
protectionist intents, rather than environmental aims, the issue became moot).
187. Tecnicas Medioambientales Teemed, S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003) [hereinafter Teemed v. Mexico].
188. Id. at ¶ 116.
189. Id. at ¶ 121.
190. Bilcon of Delaware, Inc. v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on
Jurisdiction and Liability (Mar. 17, 2015) [hereinafter Bilcon v. Canada].
191. Bilcon of Delaware, Inc. v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Statement of
Defence, 1¶ 8-10 (May 4, 2009).
192. See Bilcon v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and
Liability, ¶ 215 (Mar. 17, 2015) (noting the JRP was mandated to consider the socio-
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the JRP was not only to consider the environmental impacts of the
project but also to consider the socioeconomic effects of the project,

93
including whether the project went against community core values.1
In finding that Canada had violated its obligations of providing
fair and equitable treatment and national treatment, the majority of
the tribunal found that although the JRP had concluded that the

project would lead to adverse environmental effects, 194 it had not
proposed any mitigation measures allowing the investor to address the
environmental issues. In addition, the JRP had introduced the

95
unsubstantiated concept of community core values into its analysis.1
However, the dissenting arbitrator emphasized that community core
values were merely a proxy for "human environment effects," an
96
element with which the investor had not engaged.1

The dissenting arbitrator further noted that the majority's
decision fundamentally changed the manner of environmental reviews
197
As a
in Canada by introducing a new control over such reviews.
result, a foreign investor who is unhappy with the decision of a
Canadian environmental review panel will now be able to seek a
remedy under the NAFTA, and if successful, be awarded damages for
such a decision, despite the fact that there is no comparable damage
98
award under Canadian law.1 He thus prophesied that such a practice
would "create a chill on the operation of environmental review
panels." 199 Moreover, because the award discounted the human
environment effects of the project, he argued that this would cause
future environmental review panels in Canada to subjugate such

200
This
concerns to the scientific and technical feasibility of a project.

would change the manner of environmental review in Canada and
step backwards in environmental
result in "a remarkable
20
protection." 1
The notion of human environment effects closely links human
rights to the environment, a right formally recognized as the right to a
safe, clean, healthy, and sustainable environment. This right ensures

that states adopt and implement legal frameworks to protect against

economic effects of a project, which can include an inquiry into whether the proposed
project goes against the community's core values).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1 188.
195. Id. at 1 505-06.
196. Bilcon of Delaware, Inc. v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Dissenting
Opinion of Professor Donald McRae, ¶ 29 (Mar. 10, 2015) (who dissents from the
Tribunal's finding with respect to Canada's breach of Article 1105).
197. Id. at 1 2, 35.
198. Id. at ¶ 48.
199. Id.
200. Id. at ¶ 49.
201. Id. at ¶ 51.
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environmental harm that may infringe on the enjoyment of human

rights and it was the subject of at least one known arbitration.2 0 2 In
Pac Rim v. El Salvador,203 amici curiae argued that the actions taken
by El Salvador were designed to protect the right to a healthy
environment against the risks posed by the investor in connection with
its extractive operations. 204 Although the tribunal accepted amici
curiae's submissions, it refrained from engaging with the issue. 2 05 Its
reasoning was based on the fact that the amici curiae were not "made
privy to the mass of factual evidence" and on the grounds that the
tribunal was not required to consider this issue. 206 As a result, it
concluded that it would be "inappropriate" to do so. 207 Since the

tribunal dismissed all of the investor's claims against El Salvador, it is
unclear as to whether the tribunal was practicing judicial economy in
refraining from engaging with the right to a healthy environment or
whether it considered the issue unimportant.
In several instances, tribunals have recognized the importance of
environmental issues but have held the state to a high standard for
doing so. Indeed, where a state cannot justify its environmental
policies or implements or enforces them unjustly, tribunals have been
quick to hold the state liable. 208 For instance, in Gold Reserve v.

Venezuela, 209 the tribunal acknowledged the state's responsibility to
preserve the environment and protect the population living in the area
surrounding the investor's mining activities. 2 10 However, it went on to
note, "this responsibility does not exempt a State from complying with
its commitments to international investors by searching ways and
means to satisfy in a balanced way both conditions." 2 11 As a result, it

202. John H. Knox, Mapping Report, ¶ 72, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/53 (Dec. 30, 2013)
(Independent Expert on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment
of safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment).
203. Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, Award
(Oct. 14, 2016).
204. Id. at ¶ 3.29.
205. Id. at ¶ 3.30.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See Saar Papier Vertriebs GMBH v. Poland, Final Award, ¶ 93(c) (Oct. 16,
1995) (observing that because the state could not justify its ban on an environmental
policy ground, it should be held liable); see also Abengoa v. Mexico, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/09/2, Award, ¶ 619 (Apr. 18, 2013); MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Chile, ICSID Case
No. ARB/01/7, Award, ¶ 163 (May 25, 2004) (noting that presence of minister in
investment approval process would not have made a difference because of inconsistent
government action); Paushok v. Mongolia, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and
Liability, ¶ 696 (Apr. 28, 2011); Quiborax v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No ARB/06/2, Award,
¶¶ 219-20 (Sept. 16, 2015).
209. Gold Reserve Inc. v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/1, Award (Sept.
22, 2014).
210. Id. at ¶ 595.
211. Id.
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held the state liable for failing to give the investor an opportunity to be
21 2
heard before it revoked its permit on environmental grounds.
2 13
the tribunal held that an
Similarly, in Crystallex v. Venezuela,
214
Rather, a state has a
investor did not have a "right" to a permit.
sovereign prerogative to deny a permit, but, in doing so, it must provide

the investor with "a precise and reasoned denial" that would enable the
investor "a true opportunity to challenge that denial . . . or to remedy
the deficiencies of the project." 215 In finding the state liable, the
tribunal noted that Venezuela had raised environmental concerns only
in vague terms, without any supporting authorities, and that it had
raised concerns about global warming without having ever previously
216
communicated such concerns to the investor.

In Copper Mesa v. Ecuador, the tribunal echoed the sentiment of
the Crystallex tribunal that the investor should be given the
opportunity to challenge the state's resolutions terminating its mining
concessions. 217 Ecuador argued that its measures were adopted to
protect public health and the environment and requiring the investor
to complete an environmental impact survey was needed to protect the
local community and to reduce the environmental impacts of mining
activities. 2 18 While the tribunal found that the state should be able to
self-define its national interests and public purposes, it found the
state's conduct to be lacking because it had not given the investor the
state's resolutions. 2 19 It also concluded

due process to challenge the

that the state should have assisted the investor in completing its

environmental

assessment,

despite the vocal

protests over the

22 0
environmental effects of the mine by protesters.
A similar practice can be observed in Windstream Energy v.
Canada.221 In Windstream, Canada argued that its decision to defer
offshore wind projects-the subject of the investor's complaint-was
grounded in the precautionary principle, which involved "waiting until

sufficient research had been conducted, so that an adequately informed

212. Id. at 1 600.
213. Crystallex Int'l Corp. v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, Award,
(Apr. 4, 2016).
214. Id. at 1581.
215. Id. at ¶ 593.
216. See id. at ¶ 592-96 (explaining that the supporting evidence offered is
questionable and insufficient).
217. Copper Mesa Mining Corp. v. Ecuador, PCA No. 2012-2, Award (Mar. 15,
2016).
218. Id. at¶ 6.16
219. See id. at ¶ 6.64, 6.79, 6.83 (explaining that the state did not assist claimant
in completing its duties after its resolution rendered completion impossible).
220. Id. at 1$ 6.83-6.84.
221. Windstream Energy LLC v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2013-22, Award (Sept. 27,
2016) [hereinafter Windstream v. Canada].
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policy framework could be developed." 22 2 The tribunal accepted this
argument noting that Canada's actions were driven "by a genuine
policy concern that there was not sufficient scientific support for
establishing an appropriate setback, or exclusion zone, for offshore
wind projects." 22 3 However, the tribunal concluded that Canada did
not do enough to address the scientific uncertainty surrounding the
project, 224 either by completing the required scientific research and
allowing the project to proceed or by excluding offshore wind projects
altogether and terminating the investor's contract. 225
Despite the practice of many tribunals discounting environmental
issues, more recent cases suggest that there may be a growing trend
towards tribunals engaging with environmental issues. For instance,
in Al Tamimi v. Oman, the tribunal interpreted the minimum
standard of treatment standard in light of the importance of
environmental protection. 2 2 In doing so, the tribunal drew from the

separate chapter on the environment in the treaty as well as a
provision in the investment chapter enabling the state to ensure that
investment was undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental
concerns.227 As the tribunal noted, in determining a breach of the
minimum standard of treatment, it must be "guided by the forceful

defence of environmental regulation and protection" language in the

treaty. 228
Similarly, in Bogdanov v. Moldova, the tribunal observed that the
state's aim of protecting the environment is legitimate and that
therefore the imposition of environmental charges cannot, in and of
itself, violate the fair and equitable standard. 22 9 Likewise in Plama v.
Bulgaria,the tribunal noted that an investment treaty does not protect
investors against changes to the host country's laws. 230 Thus, Bulgaria
could change its environmental laws, without liability, unless it had
made specific promises or representations to the investor. 23 1
The recent award in Aven v. Costa Rica 2 32 suggests that some
tribunals may even be inclined to prioritize environmental issues over
investment issues. The case involved a tourism project in Costa Rica,
which was later prohibited by the government after it was revealed

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
27, 2008).
231.
justifiable
232.

Id. at ¶ 207.
Id. at ¶ 376.
Id. at ¶ 378.
Id. at ¶ 379.
Al Tamimi v. Oman, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/33, Award (Nov. 3, 2015).
Id. at ¶¶ 387-90.
Id. at ¶ 389.
Bogdanov v. Moldova, SCC Case No. V091/2012, Award, ¶ 193 (Apr. 16, 2013).
Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award (Aug.
See id. at 1 219 (explaining that investors are only protected if reasonable and
expectations were created using promises to claimant to freeze legislation).
See Aven v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/3, Award (Sept. 18, 2018).
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that it impacted on wetlands and forests. 2 33 The investors alleged
breaches of FET and indirect expropriation, while the state
counterclaimed that the works undertaken by the investor "caused
considerable environmental damage" which they should repair and
restore. 234
The tribunal found that the treaty contained a provision that

enabled a state to enact a measure, otherwise consistent with the
investment chapter of the treaty, to attend to environmental
concerns. 2 35 This provision, the tribunal found, subordinated the rights

of investors to the state's right to ensure the investment attended to
environmental concerns, so long as the state's actions were fair and

236
Having found that wetlands and the
nondiscriminatory in nature.
forest were impacted by the investor's project, the tribunal concluded

that Costa Rica's actions in halting the project were justified and
23 7
dismissed all of the investor's claims.

In considering the counterclaim, the tribunal concluded that
foreign investors could be subject to international law obligations
relating to the environment. 238 However, such obligations would not be
affirmative in nature. 239 Moreover, an investor's breach of a state's

2 40
environmental regulation would not arise to a breach of the treaty.
Perhaps tribunal recognition of the environmental issues in Aven

is a reflection of the state's environmental-related counterclaim. At
least two other awards have involved states using counterclaims to
highlight environmental issues in investment disputes that have been
24
well received by arbitral tribunals. 1 In Perenco v. Ecuador, Ecuador

counterclaimed against the investor alleging that it had caused an
"environmental catastrophe" by operating oil blocks in the Amazon
rainforest. 242 The tribunal found the investor's conduct troubling and

one that did not "paint a picture of a responsible environmental

233. Aven v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/3, Counter Memorial, ¶ 248
(Apr. 8, 2016).
234. Id. at 1 648-57.
235. DR-CAFTA, supra note 46, at art. 17.2(1)(b).
236. Aven v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/3, Award, ¶ 413 (Sept. 18,
2018).
237. Id. at Part XIV.
238. See Aven v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/3, Award, I¶ 737-38 (Sept.
18, 2018) (concluding that investors operating internationally are immune from
international law).
239. Id. at 1 743.
240. Id.
241. See Burlington Res. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on
Counterclaims (Feb. 7, 2017); Perenco v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Interim
Decision On The Environmental Counterclaim (Aug. 11, 2015).
242. Perenco v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Interim Decision On The
Environmental Counterclaim, 1 34 (Aug. 11, 2015).
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steward." 24 3 After consulting with an independent expert, the tribunal
awarded damages to Ecuador in the amount of USD $54 million. 244
In a related arbitration, Burlington Resources Inc. v. Ecuador.,
Ecuador counterclaimed against Perenco's partner Alleging breaches of
Ecuadorian environmental law and contractual obligations and
seeking compensation of approximately $2.8 billion. 245 The tribunal
defined environmental harm as significant loss or impairment to the
pre-existing conditions in the environment or one of its components,
subject to applicable limits. 246 The tribunal engaged in a thorough
review of the investor's oilfields, classified each site, and ruled on any
contamination claimed at each site. 24 7 However, where it was difficult
to determine appropriate classifications for the sites, the tribunal
applied "the principles of precaution" in Ecuador's favour, ultimately
awarding the state USD $41.7 million in damages. 248
In addition to counterclaims, states may be highlighting
environmental issues as a jurisdictional issue. 249 In Cortec v. Kenya,25 0

the tribunal recently accepted such a claim, wherein it declined the
investor's claim at the jurisdiction stage on the grounds that it had not
obtained an environmental impact assessment license. As the tribunal
observed: "The text and purpose of the BIT and the ICSID Convention
are not consistent with holding host governments financially
responsible for investments created in defiance of their laws
fundamental
[sic]
protecting
public interests
such as the
environment." 25 1
Finding that the investor's failure to comply with Kenya's
environmental regulations was of "fundamental importance" 252 and
which showed "serious disrespect"2 5 3 for the state's environmental
policies, the tribunal held that the proportionate response was to deny
the investor protection under the treaty. 254

243. Id. at 1 447.
244. Perenco v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Award, ¶¶ 889-99 (Sept. 27,
2019).
245. See Burlington Res. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on
Counterclaims (Feb. 7, 2017).
246. See id. ¶¶ 276, 291-92 (defining environmental harm under the EML
generally and defining limits).
247. See, e.g., id. at 1 889 (listing remediation amounts).
248. Id. at 1 343.
249. See, e.g., Lucchetti,v. Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/4 Award (Feb. 7, 2005)
(dismissing claim due to lack of jurisdiction).
250. See, e.g., Cortec v. Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/29, Award (Oct. 22, 2018).
251. Id. at 1333.
252. Id. at 1 346.
253. Id. at ¶ 349.
254. Id. at ¶ 365.
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IV. THE TREATMENT OF NONECONOMIC RIGHTS AT ODDS WITH
DEVELOPMENT IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATIONS

The review of human rights and environment-related investment
arbitrations confirms that investment arbitrations have compromised
development goals in several instances. This has occurred by tribunals

failing to engage with these issues in the course of arbitrations or in
negating them altogether. These compromises remain problematic
despite high profile cases such as PhilipMorris or Urbaserultimately

being decided in favour of the state.255 IIA advocates have cited such
cases as proof that problems of states not being able to regulate human
256
Yet, as the review of
rights or environmental issues are overblown.
cases has shown, such cases are the exception not the norm. Indeed,

for every Philip Morris, Methanex, or Urbaser decision affirming a
state's public interest regulatory powers, there are cases such as
Bilcon, Azurix, Copper Mesa, CMS Gas, and so on, countering any
suggested progress. 25 7

The compromises to development ideals also persist despite states
statistically "winning" investment arbitrations more often than
investors. 258 While these wins could suggest that state regulatory
powers are adequately protected by investment arbitration, these
statistical wins are actually a misnomer. In actuality, states do not
"win" investment arbitrations as they are only entitled to cost awards.
Moreover, in some instances, cost awards do not fully cover the
litigation and opportunity costs states have faced in defending
investment arbitrations, particularly those that have challenged
human rights or environmental-oriented regulations. For instance, in
Chemtura v. Canada, Canada's litigation costs were approximately
USD $9 million although it was only awarded costs of USD :$6

255. See Philip Morris v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award (July 8,
2016); Urbaser v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award (Dec. 8, 2016).
256. See, e.g., Symposium, Indirect Expropriation:Is the right to regulate at risk?,
2 OECD (Dec. 12, 2005) (noting "the Methanex award alone goes a long way toward
justifying the conclusion that investment arbitrations are not putting at risk the right to
regulate."); Nikos Lavranos, After Philip Morris II: The "regulatory chill" argument
2016),
18,
(Aug.
BLOG
ARBITRATION
KLUWER
again,
failed-yet
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2016/08/18/after-philipp-morris-ii-the(archived
[https://perma.cc/Q7EA-LELH]
regulatory-chill-argument-failed-yet-again/
Nov. 12, 2019).
257. See, e.g., Azurix Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/01/12, Award (July
14, 2006); Bilcon v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability
(Mar. 17, 2015); CMS v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (May 12, 2005);
Copper Mesa Mining Corp. v. Ecuador, PCA No. 2012-2, Award (Mar. 15, 2016).
258. See Susan D. Franck & Lindsey E. Wylie, PredictingOutcomes in Investment
Treaty Arbitration, 65 DUKE L.J. 459, 459 (2015); Matthew Hodgson & Alistair
Campbell, Damages and Costs In Investment Treaty Arbitration Revisited, 14 INT'L J.
COM. TREATY ARBITRATION 4 (2017).
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million. 259 Canadian taxpayers thus bore USD $3 million in costs for

the government to defend its efforts to protect public health.
In addition, statistical counting of state "wins" does not take into
account the increasing number of settlements between the parties.
While settlements have not been subject to robust studies, Rob Howse's
recent study into this area reveals that settlements tend to involve
either "significant monetary relief for the investor" or, more troubling,
"significant adjustment of the regulatory framework to the benefit of
the investor." 2 6 0 An example of the latter consequence is seen in
relation to the Vattenfall v. Germany dispute. 26 ' In that dispute, the
investor brought an investment arbitration against Germany for-in
the investor's words-the "extremely severe"2 62 restrictions imposed
by the state on an operating permit. The restrictions were designed to
protect the Elbe River upon which the investor's coal plant would
operate as well as mitigate the climate change impacts of the plant. 263
Germany settled the case with the investor and agreed, as part of the
settlement, to drop the environmental-oriented restrictions that it had
imposed as a condition of the investor's permit. 264 It is not known
whether the settlement also entailed Germany compensating the
investor in any way. Interestingly, Vattenfall launched a second
investment arbitration against Germany for its decision to phase out
nuclear power, reportedly a decision made by Germany due to public
opposition of nuclear power generation in the wake of a nuclear power
disaster in Japan. 26 5 The arbitration is currently pending and will
surely pit health and environmental issues against investment ones

once again.2 6 6
Finally, the number of state "wins" may be a misnomer for
determining whether development ideals are being adequately
addressed in investment arbitrations because it does not take into

259. See Cris Best, Chemtura v. Canada: The Federal Government Successfully
Defends NAFTA Claim Resulting from Pesticide Ban, THECOURT.CA (Sept. 8, 2010),
http://www.thecourt.ca/chemtura-v-canada-the-federal-government-successfullydefends-nafta-claim-resulting-from-pesticide-ban/
[https://perma.c/3LMX-3Q73]
(archived Oct. 19, 2018).
260. See Robert Howse, International Investment Law and Arbitration: A
ConceptualFramework 65 (N.Y.U. Inst. for Int'l L. & Just., Working Paper No. 17, 2017).
261. Vattenfall v. Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6, Award (Mar. 11, 2011).
262. Vattenfall v. Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/06, Request for Arbitration,
¶ 36 (Mar. 20, 2009).
263. See, e.g., Sebastian Knauer, Vattenfall vs. Germany: Power Plant Battle Goes
to
International
Arbitration,
SPIEGEL
ONLINE
(July
15,
2009),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/vattenfall-vs-germany-power-plantbattle-goes-to-international-arbitration-a-636334.html
[https://perma.cc/DU5Q-C7ER]
(archived Oct. 19, 2019) (explaining the background of Vattenfall vs. Germany).
264. Vattenfall v. Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6, Award, art. 2 (Mar. 11,
2011).
265. See generallyVattenfall v. Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/06, Request for
Arbitration (Mar. 20, 2009).
266. Id.
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account the problem of regulatory chill. This is the idea that states may
be unwilling to enact public interest regulations-for example to
protect human rights or environmental issues-because they fear

being the target of an investment arbitration if they choose to do so.

267

As arbitrator Toby Landau has observed: "Without doubt, 'regulatory
265
chill' . . . definitely exists, and there [is] palpable evidence of it."
Such evidence includes Indonesia having prevented its new
environmental laws banning open pit mining from applying to foreign
investors engaged in mining activities in the country when the
26 9
New Zealand delaying
investors threatened investment arbitration;
the introduction of its tobacco plain packaging laws until Philip Morris'
arbitration on the same issue with Australia was decided; 270 and
government officials in Ontario, Canada, now routinely vetting
legislative proposals to ensure they do not trigger NAFTA Chapter 11
arbitrations. 271 Landau further confirms that he is advising
governments on the implications or consequences of a particular policy
in terms of investment arbitrations and that governments are tending
to move away from a particular policy if it risks triggering an
investment arbitration.272
Moreover, some commentators have raised concerns that
investors are using investment arbitrations as a strategy to delay or

267.

See Kyla Tienhaara, Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration:A View

from Political Science in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 606,

606 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011) (describing the evidence and effects of
regulatory chill).
268. ISDS: The devil in the trade deal, ABC (July 26,
2015>,
http://www.abe.net.au/radionational/programs/backgroundbriefing/isds-the-devil-in(archived Oct. 22, 2019)
the-trade-deal/6634538 [https://perma.cc/X6DB-GKJN]
[hereinafter Landau Comment].
269. Stuart G. Gross, InordinateChill: BITS, Non-NAFTA MITS, and Host-State
Regulatory Freedom: An Indonesian Case Study, 24 MICH. J. INTL. L. 893, 894 (2003);
Kyla Tienhaara, What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: Investor-State Disputes and the
Environment, 6 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 73, 89 (2006).
270. See Eric Crosbie & George Thomson, Why did it take 53 months for NZ to
(June
14,
2018),
cigarette
packs?,
NOTED
introduce
plain
https://www.noted.co.nz/health/health/plain-cigarette-packs-introduction-delayed-in-nz/
[https://perma.cc/U2ST-VGHW] (archived Oct. 22, 2019) (detailing the process of
introducing plain cigarette packs in New Zealand); Tariana Turia, Government moves
forward with plain packaging of tobacco products, BEEHIVE (Feb. 20, 2013),
https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/government-moves-forward-plain-packagingtobacco-products [https://perma.cc/KH5B-QSY4] (archived Oct. 22, 2019) (describing the
process leading to New Zealand adopting plain packing of tobacco products).
271. Gus van Harten & Dayna N. Scott, Investment Treaties and the Internal
Vetting of Regulatory Proposals:A Case Study from Canada, INV. TREATY NEWS (Sept.
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2017/09/26/investment-treaties-internal-vetting26, 2017),
regulatory-proposals-case-study-from-canada-gus-van-harten-dayna-nadine-scott/
[https://perma.cc/D8CN-ABZL] (archived Oct. 22, 2019).
272. Landau Comment, supra note 268.
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discourage regulation either in the defendant state or in a third

state. 273 A recent study has already found that investment arbitrations
are prompting undisclosed settlements. 274 OECD author Pohl thus
theorizes that it is feasible that investment arbitrations may well be
thwarting government regulatory efforts in secret as well.275 Given
these concerns, it seems clear that IIAs continue to threaten
development ideals, particularly those relating to human rights and
the environment.

V. THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INVESTMENT TREATIES AND

NONECONOMIC ISSUES
Tribunal reluctance to include noneconomic issues within their
analysis and interpretation of investment treaties is somewhat
surprising given that international law espouses the concept of
systemic integration. 276 As the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties specifies, international treaties should be interpreted against
the background of "relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties." 277 Customary international law
similarly confirms the concept of systemic integration. 278 Moreover,
the ICSID Convention, the NAFTA, and the Energy Charter Treaty
specify that investment disputes shall be decided in accordance with
the agreement or the law of the state in addition to the applicable rules
of international law2 79 while several IIAs specify international law as
the applicable law for the dispute. 280 As the Phoenix tribunal

&

273. See Krzysztof J. Pelc, What Explains the Low Success Rate of Investor-State
Disputes?, 71 INT'L ORG. 559, 566 (2017) (explaining the increased rate of litigation is, in
part, a result of higher perceived gains); Joachim Pohl, Societal Benefits and Costs of
International Investment Agreements: A Critical Review Of Aspects and Available
EmpiricalEvidence 65 (OECD Working Paper on Int'l Inv. 2018/01) (assessing the range
of issues associated with the societal benefits and costs of International Investment
Agreements).
274. See Emilie Hafner-Burton et al., Against InternationalSettlement? The Social
Cost of Secrecy in InternationalAdjudication 46 (U.C. San Diego Sch. Glob. Policy
Strategy, Working Paper No. 26, 2016) (providing statistics that provides evidence that
cases hidden from public view are more likely to be kept secret through settlement).
275. Pohl, supra note 273, at 65.
276. See Int'l L. Comm'n, 58th Sess., Conclusions of the Work of the Sutdy Group
on the Fragmentationof InternationalLaw: Difficulties arisingfrom the Diversification
and Expansion of InternationalLaw, 1 251, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006).
277. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31.3(c), May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M.
679, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT].
278. See LaGrand Judgment (Germany v. United States), 2001 I.C.J. 466, ¶ 99,
(June 27) (applying the Vienna Convention as applicable law).
279. See Energy Charter Treaty art. 26.6, Dec. 17, 1991, 2080 U.N.T.S. 100; ICSID
Convention, supra note 29, at art. 42.1; NAFTA, supra note 45, at art. 1131.
280. See Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment, U.S.-Arg. art 2.2, Nov. 14, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 124 (requiring that investment
be equitable under international law).
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confirmed, international investment law should be read and
281
Thus, to the
interpreted in accordance with public international law.
extent noneconomic issues are found in relevant rules of international
law, the interpretation of investment treaties must be done against the
background of these rules.
Yet beyond integration, interpretation of investment treaties may
further face instances where they must not only take into account
noneconomic interests, but in some cases, yield to them. For instance,
human rights issues that are embodied within jus cogens or
peremptory norms of international law clearly trump any investment
treaty obligation. 282 Accordingly, a state would not be expected to meet
its investment treaty obligations where the investor has engaged in
torture, genocide, or slavery. 283 Similarly, state obligations in the UN
Charter should prevail over all other treaties, including investment
treaties. 284 In particular, the UN Charter specifically references
development, compelling states to promote higher standards of living

and conditions of social progress and development, in addition to
promoting universal respect for human rights. 285 Thus, the UN
Charter arguably requires that investment treaties not be interpreted
in a manner that denounces state efforts to promote higher standards
of living and conditions of progress and development or detracts from
2 86
efforts to promote human rights.
Development ideals, including issues relating to human rights
and the environment, may also be considered general principles of
international law. They are therefore among the sources of
international law 287 that tribunals are required to consider in
288
Commentators have argued that
interpreting investment treaties.
such general principles of law may arise not only from international
treaties and customary international law, but through "direct and

spontaneous state consensus," UN General Assembly resolutions,

281. Phoenix Action Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, ¶
78 (Apr. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Phoenix v. Czech Republic].
282. Prosecutor v. Furundiija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 1 144, 147 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Dec. 10, 1998); VCLT, supra note 277, at art. 53.
283. Phoenix v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, ¶ 78 (Apr. 15,
2009).
284. U.N. Charter, art. 103 [hereinafter U.N. Charter]; VCLT, supra note 277, at
art. 30(1).
285. U.N. Charter, supra note 284, at arts. 55-56.
286. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion,
1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 131 (June 21) (interpreting the U.N. Charter to require nondiscriminatory practices).
287. See U.N. Charter, Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, ¶ 1
(specifying the sources of international law).
288. VCLT, supra note 277, at art. 31(3)(c).
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multilateral treaty preambles, and national and/or international court
judgments as well. 28 9 Several human rights norms are well established
through international treaties, such as the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 290 and customary international
law. 291 Environmental norms, although less well established than
human rights norms, can also be found in treaties and, to a lesser
extent, in customary international law. 2 92 Furthermore, the need to
protect against challenges posed by environmental degradation was
recently confirmed in a UN General Assembly resolution. 293
Consequently, as sources of international law, tribunals have leeway
to consider human rights and environmental norms as part of their
broader approach of using international law to interpret investment
treaties.
Still, incorporating human rights, environmental, or other

development-related rules of international law as part of an effort of
the systemic integration of international law or as a source of
international law is unlikely to enable tribunals to resolve pronounced

conflicts between investment treaty obligations and noneconomic
issues in favor of the latter. As a result, the next Part turns to examine
methods by which investment treaties can be reformed to better
incorporate development ideals, thereby preventing (or limiting) such
conflicts in the first place.

VI. REFORMING INVESTMENT TREATIES TO BETTER INCORPORATE
DEVELOPMENT IDEALS

If development is the ultimate aim of HAs, states need to consider
whether these treaties are the best vehicle for achieving this aim, even
if such treaties are reconstituted to incorporate more elements

289.

See,

e.g.,

GEBHARD

BOCHELER,

PROPORTIONALITY

IN

INVESTMENT

ARBITRATION, 104-06 (2015); Philip Alston & Bruno Simma, The Sources of Human
Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTRALIAN Y.B. INT'L L.
82, 105 (1988); Stefan Kadelbach & Thomas Kleinlein, International Law-A
Constitution for Mankind? An Attempt at a Reappraisal with an Analysis of
ConstitutionalPrinciples,50 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 303, 342 (2007).
290. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (Dec. 16, 1966) (general assembly resolution based on U.N. Charter).
291.

See, e.g., BRIAN D. LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW THEORY

WITH PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 3 (2010) ("The ICJ ... has implied that the basic rights
of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination have
become part of the corpus of customary law."); THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 1 (1991) (noting human rights law norms

bind states that are not parties to the instrument in which the norm is rested).
292.

See generally DANIEL BODANSKY

ET AL.,

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK

OF

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2008) (providing a thorough overview of
international environmental law).
293. See G.A. Res. 72/277, Towards a Global Pact for the Environment (May 14,
2018) (proposing the strengthening of environmental protections).
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consistent with development. As a commentator argues, investment

treaties should not be humanized, but rather one should "envisage a
294
Not surprisingly, the
world without an investment rules regime."

World Bank takes a more pragmatic approach, noting that states
withdrawing from the system must be mindful not only of the "costs of
the policy reversal, but also the broader costs of reneging on an
international commitment for which their partners will hold them
295

accountable."
UNCTAD's work on investor state dispute settlement (ISDS)

reform, however, suggests that states are largely interested in reform
rather than exit. 296 Of course, not all states are interested in the same
extent of reform. Some states champion only incremental changes
while others prefer systemic or even paradigmatic changes. 297
Nevertheless, the overriding trend seems to be continued state interest
2 98
in investment treaties albeit with varying levels of reform.
Because of the state interest in reform to investment treaties, this
presents an opportune time to better incorporate development ideals

into the treaties, both at the substantive and at the procedural level.

-

While there is not always a clear division between substantive and
procedural reforms-as they are often related-this Part first
examines substantive reform ideas, focusing mainly on reworking
substantive treaty standards and provisions, before turning to ideas to
reform procedural issues.

A. Substantive Reform
As with other areas of international economic law, the idea of
linkage-or establishing relationships between two areas of the lawis well established in international investment law. 299 The natural

294. DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, RESISTING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: CRITICAL
THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 5 (2016).
295. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997: THE STATE IN A
CHANGING WORLD 101 (1997).

296. See Anthea Roberts, Incremental, Systemic, and Paradigmatic Reform of
Investor-State Arbitration 113 AM. J. INT'L L. 410 (2018) (providing an overview of
UNCTAD's recent reform effort on ISDS).
297. Id.
298. See Sergio Puig & Gregory Shaffer, Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional
Choice and the Reform of Investment Law, 112 AM. J. INT'L L. 361, 367 (2018) (discussing
how states are proposing institutional reforms in UNCITRAL); Roberts, supra note 296,
at 410.
299. See, e.g., VALENTINA S. VADI, CULTURAL HERITAGE IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 48 (2014) (discussing the "linkage paradigm"
between international cultural law and other branches of international law); CHRISTIAN
J. TAMS ET AL., International Investment Law and the Global Financial Architecture:
Identifying Linkages, Mapping Interactions, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE 3-4 (2017) ("[P]arts of the international legal
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solution for incorporating more development-related issues into an IIA
would thus suggest that they be better linked to development goals,
most notably by including greater references to human rights or
environmental issues. However, in doing so, states must be mindful of
how these issues are incorporated. In particular, framing the
incorporation of development ideals through a human rights lens risks
the possibility of investors seizing the reference to these rights for their
own use. This is important because although tribunals have been
reluctant to consider how investment issues affect citizens' human
rights, they have been more willing to take into account how investors'
human rights issues have been affected. 300 Moreover, as the experience
in US courts has shown, when corporations co-opt human rights issues
for their own purposes, the end result can be very different from that
imagined by human rights advocates. 301 Conversely, incorporating
human rights or environmental issues through references to
sustainable development is less likely to increase the investor's arsenal
of rights.
For many, reform to substantive treaty provisions should also aim
to strike the right balance between investor protection and sovereign
state regulatory right's.3 02 The concern is that without achieving this
balance, investors will be dissuaded from investing in foreign
countries, as their foreign investments will not be safeguarded by the
investment treaty provisions. 303 As authors of a report critiquing
India's new Model BIT observe, the BIT regime plays a role in

infrastructure governing the global market economy, international investment law and
the global financial architecture have never been sealed off from one another.");
Valentina S. Vadi, Reconciling Public Health and Investor Rights: The Case of Tobacco,
in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 452 (Pierre

Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009) (discussing linkage in the context of tobacco); Vid Prislan
& Ruben Zandvliet, Labor Provisions in International Investment Agreements: Prospects
for Sustainable Development, Y.B. INT'L INV. L. & POL'Y 3, 8 (2012-2013) (examining
three factors that'contribute to the main rationale for investment-labor linkage).
300. See Vivian Kube & E.U. Petersmann, Human Rights Law In International
Investment Arbitration, 11 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POLY 65, 73 (2016)
(discussing that if applicable law clauses are sufficiently broad enough to include human
rights violations, then adjudicating a human rights claim can be possible).
301. See Jose E. Alvarez, Are Corporations "Subjects"of International Law?, 9
SANTA CLARA J. INT'L. L. 1, 17-21 (2011) (raising concerns in connection with the Citizens
United case in which the corporation argued that one of its "human" rights was being
infringed).
302. See, e.g., U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., Investment Policy Framework for
Sustainable Development, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/PCB/2015/5, at 6 (2015); Congyan
Cai, Balanced Investment Treaties and the BRICS; 112 AM. J. INT'L L. 191, 217 (2018)
(discussing how treaty policies of BRICS countries vary in their approaches to reforming
investor-state disputes); Prabhash Ranjan et al., India's Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty: Is India Too Risk Averse?, BROOKINGS INDIA IMPACT SERIES 5 (2018)
(highlighting the problem in India that investors can bring legal claims against host
states if the state's sovereign regulatory scheme is inconsistent with "bilateral
investment treaties").
303. See Ranjan et al., supra note 302, at 38 (arguing that having a balanced
investment treaty regime would help foreign investment in India).
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attracting foreign investment, strengthens the rule of law, and
improves the perception of foreign investors that it is easier to do
304
While these arguments in support of
business within the country.

open to debate,

states acting as both

importers and exporters are

more likely to require

investment treaties are
investment

balanced treaties to ensure that their investors, when acting abroad,
are adequately protected. 305 A balanced treaty may also be integral to
concluding IIAs with "key" states, such as the United States, the EU,
and China. 306
Thus, for some states, moving too far towards the protection of
sovereign regulatory rights may be detrimental to the protection of
their foreign investors or for concluding IIAs with certain states,
making a balanced treaty imperative. Yet this argument is less true in

other circumstances. For states acting primarily only as investment
importers, not exporters, they do not necessarily need to be overly
concerned with the protection of foreign investor rights, except when
concluding treaties with states that demand such protections. In other
words, apart from concluding IIAs with key states, there may be
greater leeway for investment-importing states to include further
protections for regulatory rights in IIAs. Moreover, investment
importing states may be able to negotiate greater regulatory rights
(i.e., less balanced) treaties with investment importing and exporting

states who are cognizant of such issues. This could include states such
as Canada, which is the developed country with the highest number of
human rights and environmental-related investment arbitrations, or

Norway, which has made efforts to conclude BITs with greater
307
attention to regulatory concerns.
As a result, there remains room for imbalance

or greater

protection of sovereign regulatory rights, if needed. This can be
achieved by articulating the right to regulate, reforming the fair and

equitable

standard,

including

exception

and

other

safeguard

provisions, and creating investor obligation provisions.

1. The Right to Regulate
A simple mechanism for reinforcing a state's regulatory space for
developmental goals is to formally articulate the state's right to
regulate. For instance, the Morocco-Nigeria BIT specifies in its

304. Id.
305. See Cai, supra note 302, at 219 (emphasizing the need to balance state
interests with those of overseas investors).
306. See id. at 219-20 (highlighting the need and effect of large western powers to
adopt reform measures of balancing treaties).
307. See, e.g., Norway Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2007); Norway Model
Bilateral Investment Treaty (2015).
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preamble "the right of the State Parties to regulate and to introduce
new measures relating to investments in their territories in order to
meet national policy objectives." 308 The right to regulate may also

appear as a separate provision of the treaty. The Argentina-Qatar BIT,
for instance, specifies that nothing in the BIT shall affect the right of
the state parties to regulate "through measures necessary to achieve
legitimate policy objectives." 309
The effects of these types of provisions on state's regulatory space
is typically muted since they neither create any legally enforceable
rights or obligations nor create regulatory space.. 31 0 Rather, they
perform "auxiliary functions" by denoting the weight to be accorded to

specific public interests, offer a presumption that state regulatory
interest will be taken into account, or confirm that investor protection
obligations are not absolute. 3 1 1 They may also help define the object
and purpose of the BIT and its context, which in turn can be used in
the interpretation of the treaty. 312 Indeed, in Al Tamimi and Aven the
tribunals drew on a treaty provision that enabled states to regulate
investments to ensure they were undertaken in a manner sensitive to
environmental concerns to interpret the fair and equitable treatment
standard in light of environmental concerns. 3 13

Thus, state declarations of the right to regulate may be helpful in
a broader context of the overall interpretation of the BIT. However, on
their own, they are unlikely to act as an adequate counter to
investment protection provisions in BITs.
2. Fair and Equitable Treatment

Given that declaratory provisions do little to help establish state
regulatory powers, particularly as they relate to development goals,
reform must be directed at substantive provisions. As the -review of

308. Bilateral Investment Treaty, Nigeria-Morocco, pmbl., 2016. See also Bilateral
Investment Treaty, Braz.-Malawi, pmbl., June 25, 2015 ("Desiring to encourage and
strengthen contacts between private sector and the Governments of the two countries.")
[hereinafter Brazil-Malawi BIT]; Bilateral Investment Treaty, Montenegro-U.A.E.,
pmbl., 2012 ("Desiring to create conditions for fostering greater investment by investors
of one Party in the territory of the other Party."); Bilateral Investment Treaty, Indon.Tunis., pmbl., 1992 ("Intending to create favourable conditions for investments by
investors of one Party in the territory of the other Party on the basis of sovereign equality
and mutual benefit.").
309. Bilaterial Investment Treaty, Arg-Qatar, art. 10, 2016 [hereinafter
Argentina-Qatar BIT].
310. AKATERINI TITI, THE RIGHT TO REGULATE IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 104 (2014).

311. Vera Korzun, The Right To Regulate In Investor-State Arbitration: Slicing
And Dicing Regulatory Carve-Outs, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 355, 374 (2017); TITI,
supranote 310, at 104-05.
312. VCLT, supra note 277, at art. 31(1).
313. See Al Tamimi v. Oman, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/33, Award, J¶ 387-90 (Nov.
3, 2015); Aven v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/3, Award, ¶ 412 (Sept. 18, 2018).
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human rights and environment-related investment arbitrations has

shown, most claims in this area are centred around violations of
expropriation and fair and equitable treatment. While the notion that

state regulations should not be considered as expropriations was
recognized as early as 1961 in the Harvard Draft Convention on the
International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, 314
investment treaties did not formally recognize this idea until around
model BITs for Canada3 1s6 and

the early 2000s.315 However, by 2004,
the United States, 317 among others, began to formally proclaim the

disconnect between regulations and expropriations, stating, for
instance, that: "Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory
regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect

legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and
318
the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations."
One tribunal confirmed the difference between expropriations and

regulations, noting that "[e]xpropriations tend to involve the
3 19
deprivation of ownership rights; regulations a lesser interference."
It is thus not surprising that, of the investment arbitrations surveyed,

public policy regulations were less likely to constitute an indirect
expropriation. 320

However, while states have been careful to circumscribe the ambit.
of indirect expropriation provisions in IIAs and protecting regulatory
powers in that context, they have not consistently made similar

inroads into the area of fair and equitable treatment. FET claims have
accordingly become the investor's preferred route to investment

314. Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for
Injuries to Aliens Reprinted in Louis B. Sohn & R. R. Baxter, Responsibility of States for
Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens: II. Draft Convention on the International
Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 548, art. 10(5) (1961).
315.

See CANADA MODEL FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND PROMOTION ACT, Annex

B.13(1)(c) (2004), https://www.italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7SXG-BGFH] (archived Oct. 23, 2019) (mentioning the idea that state
regulations should not be considered expropriations); U.S. Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty, Annex B, art. 4(b), 2012, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
117601.pdf [https://perma.cc/G82N-UJ5B] (archived Oct. 23, 2019) [hereinafter U.S.
Model BIT] (mentioning the same idea as the model Canada Act).
316.

CANADA MODEL FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND PROMOTION ACT, supra note 317,

at Annex B 13(1)(C).
317. U.S. Model BIT, supra note 315, at Annex B, art. 4(b)
318. Id.
319. SDMI v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 1 282 (Nov. 13, 2000).
320. See id. (detailing that sixteen out of fifty-six awards contained an (indirect)
expropriation breach. Moreover, in many of those instances, the treaty in question was
a pre-2004 treaty that did not contain the language excepting regulations from the ambit
of indirect expropriation).
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arbitrations. 321 As noted earlier, FET claims are particularly
problematic in human rights and environment-related investment
arbitrations since they constitute the bulk of successful investment
arbitration claims in this area.32 2
Part of the problem with the FET standard is the vague and
ambiguous terms it encompasses, which are undefined, and which are
subject to open interpretation by tribunals. 323 This has enabled the
FET standard to take on a wide variety of meaning from due process
to racial prejudice to transparency and beyond.3 24 In particular, one
especially problematic element tribunals have attributed to the FET
standard is the concept of-legitimate expectations. This is the idea that

an investor has expectations of the host state, for instance, that the
state will act free from ambiguity and transparently so that the
investor may know beforehand all rules and regulations that will
govern its investment.325 In the context of human rights-related and
environment-related investment arbitrations, the concept of legitimate
expectations has underpinned breaches of the FET standard in
disputes such as Enron, 326 Tecmed, 32 7 CMS, 32 8 and Suez, 329 among
others. Tribunals have been especially critical of host states that have
made regulatory changes that altered the legal framework of the

321.

See

MUTHUCUMARASWAMY

SORNARAJAH,

RESISTANCE

AND

CHANGE

IN

INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 247-48 (2013) (highlighting the problems in
investment arbitration and current changes).
322. See SDMI v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 282 (Nov. 13, 2000) (just
over half of the fixty-six awards surveyed contained a FET breach).
323. See Fair and Equitable Treatment, UNCTAD SERIES " ON ISSUES IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS II, 10-12, UNCT AD/DIAE/IA/2011/5 (2012)
(mentioning the inconsistency in understanding the FET standard); FULVIO MARIA
PALOMBINO, FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT AND THE FABRIc OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES

20 (2018) (describing five different ways in which FET has been characterized); Gtine§
Unuvar, The Vague Meaning of Fair and Equitable Treatment Principle in Investment
Arbitration and New Generation Clarifications 6 (iCourts Working Paper Ser. No. 55,
2016) (arguing for the necessity of clarifications).
324. See Waste Mgmt. Inc. v. United States, 43 I.L.M. 967, ¶ 98 (2004) (racial
prejudice); MARTINS PAPARINSKIS, THE INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM STANDARD AND FAIR

AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT 197, 228 (2013) (human right to fair trial and property);
ROLAND KLAGER, FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW

213, 227 (2011) (fair procedure and transparency); Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable
Treatment: Today 's Contours, 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 7, 29 (2014) (due process).
325. Tecmed v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 154 (May 29,
2003).
326. Enron Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB01/3, Award, 1 262 (May 22,
2007).
327. Tecmed v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 154 (May 29,
2003).
328. See CMS v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 121 (May 12,
2005).
329. See Suez v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Jurisdiction,
¶ 262 (May 16, 2006).
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investment. 3 30 Under this view, the concept of legitimate expectations
is treated as a type of stabilization clause wherein the host state's laws
33
are expected to be frozen from the time of the investment. 1 Although
there has been pushback from some tribunals on this interpretation of
legitimate expectations-notably, the Continental Casualty tribunal
observed it would be "unconscionable for a country to promise not to
332
-the notion of
change its legislation as time and needs change"
legitimate expectations persists. This is despite the fact that neither
treaty texts nor custom refer to legitimate expectations, and it is not a
concept likely to have been contemplated by the parties to the
334

treaties. 33 3 It is thus purely an "arbitralinnovation."
The ever-expanding FET standard, and particularly the concept

of legitimate expectation, therefore, remains a moving target for states
and a threat to state ability to regulate development-related issues.
Accordingly, given the impact of FET claims to thwart human rights

and environment-related issues, states should ensure the FET
standard remains carefully circumscribed. One approach to doing so
would be to remove the FET standard altogether.335 India has taken
this approach in its newly revised model BIT, by replacing the FET
6
standard with "treatment of investors."3 3 Such treatment prohibits
measures "which constitute a violation of customary international law"
and limits measures to denial of justice, breach of due process, targeted
discrimination, or manifestly abusive treatment. 337 By taking this

approach, India has removed the ability of tribunals to develop content

330. See, e.g., Enron Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB01/3, Award, ¶ 265
(May 22, 2007) (ruling in favor of Enron's reasonable belief); Suez v. Argentina, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 226-31 (May 16, 2006) (ruling against
the changes made by the host state).
331. Thomas W. Walde & George Ndi, Stabilizing International Investment
Commitments: International Law versus Contract Interpretation, 31 TEX. INTL. L. J. 215,
220-24, 245 (1996).
332. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 362 (Sept.
5, 2008). See also Eiser Infrastructure Ltd. v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, Final
Award, ¶ 362 (May 4, 2017) ("[I]nvestment treaties do not eliminate States' right to
modify their regulatory regimes to meet evolving circumstances and public needs."); EDF
Services Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award, ¶ 217-18 (Oct. 8, 2009)
(quoting Parkerings v. Lithuania); Parkerings v. Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8,
Award, ¶ 332 (Sept. 11, 2007) ("A state has the right to enact, modify or cancel a law at
its own discretion . . . any businessman or investor knows that laws will evolve over
time.").
333. SORNARAJAH, supra note 321, at 256; PAPARINSKIS, supra note 324, at 25356.
334. Dolzer, supra note 324, at 9.
335. See generally Enrique Barrera, The Case for Removing the Fair and Equitable
Treatment Standard from NAFTA (CIGI Papers No. 128, April 2017) (arguing for
removing the standard entirely).
336. India Model BIT, supra note 55, at art. 3.1.
337. Id.
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for the FET standard and has narrowed the grounds for state liability
only to the enumerated grounds, notably excluding the concept of

legitimate expectations

and arbitrariness. This approach clearly

foregoes the concept of balance for a decisive reorientation and
strengthening of state sovereignty.
A second approach would be to retain the fair and equitable
standard but continue to prescribe the grounds for breach of the
standard. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for TransPacific Partnership has taken this approach, referring to the FET
standard in its investment chapter, but limiting its scope only to
grounds of denial of justice in accordance with the principle of due.
process. 338 It also goes on to note that the standard is the one
prescribed by customary international law, that it cannot be triggered
by breach of another provision of the agreement or a separate
international agreement, and that an action by a state that is
inconsistent with an investor's expectations does not constitute a
breach of the standard. 3 39 As with India's approach, this approach
swings toward state sovereignty over balance.
For states searching for a more balanced approach, a third
approach would be to delineate the grounds for the FET standard but

to make provision for a review of the content of the standard if needed.
The EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
adopts such an approach. It limits the FET standard to denial of
justice, fundamental breach of due process, manifest arbitrariness,
targeted discrimination, abusive treatment of investors, 340 in addition
to any treatment, as defined by the parties, developed subsequently to

the signing of the agreement. 34 1 The agreement also incorporates the
concept of legitimate expectations, no.ting that in applying the FET
obligation, a tribunal can consider whether a specific representation
was made to an investor to induce an investment. 342 It thus specifies
legitimate expectations as a factor to be used to construct breaches of
FET, not as an element of fair and equitable in and of itself.
A final approach, which swings in the direction of increased state
sovereignty, would be to prescribe the elements of the FET standard,
but to remove it from the scope of investor-state dispute resolution. As
commentators have suggested, this would still require states to afford
such treatment to investors, but disputes over treatment would be
resolved through other means, such as through consultations or stateto-state dispute resolution. 34 3

338. CPTPP, supra note 45, at art. 9.6.2(a).
339. Id. at art. 9.6.
340. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-E.U., art. 8.10(2), Oct.
30, 2016 [hereinafter CETA].
341. Id. at art. 8.10(3).
342. Id. at art. 8.10(4).
343. Mona Pinchis-Paulsen, A NAFTA Proposal: Fix the FET Investment
Protection Commitment, INT'L EcON. L. & POL'Y BLOG (Sept. 27, 2017),

2020)

INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND NONECONOMICISSUES

49

While states must decide for themselves whether they require a

balanced or sovereigntist FET approach,

from a developmental

perspective, the most important reform to the FET standard would be
to curtail arbitrator discretion to define its elements, for instance, by
prescribing its elements. Yet even in prescribing FET's elements,
states must ensure that the words used to define the FET elements are
not, themselves, open to arbitral interpretation. For instance, in the
34 4
seems prone to being
EU-Canada CETA, manifest arbitrariness
interpreted in a myriad of ways, leaving an opening for a judicially
active arbitral tribunal. Similarly, given the expansive scope given by
arbitral tribunals to the concept of legitimate expectations, a
development perspective would suggest that this concept be left

entirely out of the FET standard. To that end, the CFTPP adopts a
prudent approach by specifically denouncing legitimate expectations,

in and of itself, as an element of FET.
In addition, to further protect state ability to regulate for
development goals, states should consider adding a section to the FET
standard that further defines the standard, mimicking the wording
found in indirect expropriation provisions. Thus, in the same way that
indirect expropriation standards note that "non-discriminatory
regulatory actions that are designed and applied to protect legitimate
public welfare objectives do not constitute indirect expropriations,"
FET standards should contain language that nondiscriminatory
regulatory actions that are designed and applied to protect legitimate
public welfare objectives do not constitute a breach of fair and
equitable treatment. In doing so, state regulatory power becomes

further insulated from the FET standard.
3. Safeguard Provisions
A third option for reform is to focus on provisions that safeguard
the state ability to regulate. This includes exceptions provisions,
provisions that exclude application of the treaty entirely, and
reservations. For instance, in almost all of its post-2012 treaties,

Canada has borrowed some of the text of the general exceptions
provisions found in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). 345 Canada denotes nonarbitrary measures that are necessary

https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2017/09/a-nafta-proposal-fix-the-fet(archived
[https://perma.cc/VKW9-VKFV]
investment-protection-commitment-.html
Oct. 22, 2019); see also Todd Tucker, Accountability in a Regime Complex: Charting
Policy Reforms for Investor-State Dispute Settlement, PENAL ON JUDICIALIZATION INT'L
REL. (2016).
344. CETA, supra note 340, at art. 8.10(2)(c).
345. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. XX,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
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to protect human, animal, or plant life; or health; or that relate to the
conservation of living or nonliving natural resources, among others, as
exceptions to the IIA. 346 Similarly, other states have specified
measures that protect public morals, maintain public order, or
measures that protect national treasures as general exceptions to their
IIA obligations as well. 347
This approach, however, raises two problems. First, it requires
states to pass a "necessity" test to rely on the exception relating to
human, animal, or plant life or health in addition to demonstrating
that its measures are not arbitrary, discriminatory, or a disguised
restriction on trade. 348 The necessity test has proved particularly
susceptible to tribunal interpretations, as the Argentinian financial
crisis cases have demonstrated, suggesting that in many instances
states will not be able to rely on such an exception. 349 Some states have
circumvented the necessity test problem by removing any reference to

the word "necessary," enabling states to take measures simply "to
fulfil" its obligations. 350
A second problem with the use of GATT-style general exception
provisions is that tribunals may treat the list of exceptions as
exhaustive. In Bear Creek v. Peru, Peru attempted to argue that its
actions were justified by the police powers exception. 351 The
investment treaty in question contained a general exceptions
provision, but it did not make any specific reference to the police
powers exception. 352 The tribunal ruled that the general exceptions
provision was exhaustive, thereby preventing Peru from relying on the
police powers exception unless specifically provided for in the list of

346. See Bilateral Investment Treaty, Can.-China, art. 33, Sept. 8, 2012
(exceptions) [hereinafter Canada-China BIT].
347. See, e.g., ASEAN-India Investment Agreement art. 21, Nov. 12, 2014
(including public morals and animals); Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and
Protection of Investment, Iran-Japan, art. 13, Feb. 5, 2016 (including public morals); see
also Economic Partnership Agreement, Japan-Mong., art. 1.10, Feb. 10, 2015
(incorporating GATT exceptions from 1994).
348. See Arthur Appleton, GATT Article XX's Chapeau: A Disguised 'Necessary'
Test?, 6 REv. EUR., COMP. & INT'L ENVTL. L. 131, 136 (1997); Ming Du, The Necessity Test
in World Trade Law: What Now?, CHINESE J. INT'L L. 817 (2016); Gisele Kapterian, A
Critiqueof the WTO Jurisprudenceon Necessary, 59 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 89, 90 (2010).
349. See Barnali Choudhury, Exception Provisions as a Gateway to Incorporating
Human Rights Issues into International Investment Agreements, 49 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 670, 697 (2011) (using the Argentinian cases to interpret the exception
provisions).
350. See, e.g., Bilateral Investment Treaty, Egypt-Mauritius, art. 13, June 25,
2014 (using language "to fulfill") [hereinafter Egypt-Mauritius BIT]; Bilateral
Investment Treaty, China-Sing., art. 11, Nov. 21, 1985 (using language "to apply")
[hereinafter China-Singapore BIT].
351. Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/2, Award, ¶J 45152 (Nov. 30, 2017) [hereinafter Bear Creek v. Peru].
352. Bilateral Investment Treaty, Peru-Can., art. 10, Nov. 14, 2006.
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general exceptions. 353 In other words, including a list of general
exceptions curtailed the state's regulatory power to the enumerated
grounds only rather than broadened them.
Rather than rely on some form of GATT-style language, some

states have chosen to tie exceptions in their BITs to the specific
regulatory power they wish to protect. For instance, BITs with
Singapore

354 or Mauritius 355 contain an exception provision that

provides the right of states to take any action directed to the protection
of public health or protection of the environment. Similarly, in the
Kenya-Korea BIT, the states commit to free transfers of payments

except in specified circumstances such as the threat of "external
financial circumstances." 356 The United States, in its model BIT,
specifies that the agreement will not impose obligations with respect
3 57
Several states also
to taxation measures unless otherwise provided.
35 8
Thus, the
reasons.
prudential
for
adopted
exempt state measures
Iran-Slovakia BIT exempts state measures adopted to ensure the
integrity and stability of the state's financial system from the scope of

the BIT. 359
Unlike using GATT-style language, tying exceptions to a specific
regulatory aim ensures that the sovereign areas of control the state

wishes to preserve are specifically targeted and protected.
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that a state can ex ante predict all of the
regulatory powers it wishes to protect. This suggests that such an
approach is helpful but insufficient.

Accordingly, on the understanding that a state wishes to protect
certain regulatory powers but cannot anticipate what all those powers
might be, states have a number of options. First, if adopting GATT-

style language, the state should specifically denote that the list of
exceptions does not preclude the state's reliance on other exceptions or
defences found in customary international law to prevent future Bear
Creek problems. Alternatively, the state can codify the police powers
exception either by adding it to its list of exceptions or by using it as a
standalone provision. For example, following the holding in Methanex,

353. Bear Creek v. Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/2, Award, ¶¶ 473-74 (Nov. 30,
2017).
354. See, e.g., Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 11, Viet.-Sing., Oct. 29, 1992;
China-Singapore BIT, supra note 350, at art. 11.
355. See, e.g., Bilateral Investment Treaty, Mauritius-India, art. 11.3, Apr. 9, 1998
(public health exception); Egypt-Mauritius BIT, supranote 350, at art. 13 (public health
exception).
356. Bilateral Investment Treaty, Kenya-S. Kor., art. 6(3)-(4) Aug. 7, 2014.
357. U.S. Model BIT, supra note 315, at art. 21.
358. See, e.g., Bilateral Investment Treaty, Colom.-Turk., art. 2(4), July, 28 2014
(mentioning "prudential reasons" specifically); Canada-China BIT, supra note 346, at
art. 33(3) (setting out specific "prudential reasons").
359. Slovakia-Iran BIT, supra note 50, at art. 11.2.
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states can include in the text of BITs the following wording: provided
that it is not applied in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner and has

been enacted with due process, a measure enacted for a public purpose
which affects a foreign investment is not compensable.
Second, states can try to limit the interpretive discretion currently
afforded to tribunals when interpreting safeguard provisions. This can
be done by removing value-laden words such as "necessary" and
replacing it with more factual based wording (such as "directed to").
Alternatively, it could involve including text denoting that a measure
is self-judging. The China-Chile BIT, 360 for instance, exempts
measures that it considers necessary to protect its essential security
interests, thereby preserving state control over deciding whether a
measure is needed. 361 Another approach is to give state parties sole
authority to determine whether a state may rely on a particular
safeguard provision. For instance, the United States model BIT
provides that the state parties must decide whether a taxation
measure constitutes an expropriation before such a claim can be made
in an investment arbitration. 36 2 Similarly, the Australia-China FTA
exempts measures for legitimate public welfare objectives from being
subject to investment arbitration, but requires the state parties to
provide a binding decision confirming whether the measure in question
falls within the purview of this exception.363

Finally,

states could subject disputes concerning regulatory

measures aimed at protecting human rights and/or the environment to
a different dispute resolution mechanism altogether. Such disputes
could be regulated by state-to-state dispute resolution or by joint state
party committees or ombudsmen as a means of limiting investor
challenges to public policy regulations. More radically, states could
exempt such regulatory measures from investment arbitration
altogether. The CPTPP and some Singaporean BITs already employ
such a practice with their tobacco carve-outs that enable state parties
to deny investors the ability to bring an investment arbitration

challenging a tobacco control measure. 364 States could follow a similar
practice for human rights/environmental protection-oriented measures

360. Bilateral Investment Treaty, H.K.-Chile, art. 6(b), Nov. 11, 2016 [hereinafter
Hong Kong-Chile BIT].
361. SALACUSE, supra note 1, at 381.
362. U.S. Model BIT, supra note 315, at art. 21(2).
363. Free Trade Agreement, China-Austl., art. 9.11.4-9.11.6, June 17, 2015
("Measures of a Party that are non-discriminatory and for the legitimate public welfare
objectives of public health, safety, the environment, public morals or public order shall
not be the subject of a claim under this Section.") [hereinafter China-Australia FTA]; see
also Free Trade Agreement, pmbl., EAEU-Viet., May 29, 2015 (recognizing the need to
uphold principles to promote free, non-discriminatory trade practices).
364. Bilateral Investment Treaty, Sing.-Kaz., art. 11(2), Nov. 21, 2018; Free Trade
Agreement, Sing.-Austl., art. 22, Dec. 1, 2017 [hereinafter SAFTA]; CPTPP, supra note
45, at art. 29.5.
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and prohibit such measures from even being the subject of an ISDS
claim.

4. Investor Obligations
A fourth option for reform is to create responsibilities for investors

regarding state developmental goals. Today it is widely recognized that
365
businesses have responsibilities not to harm people's human rights
or the environment, although IIAs do not reflect such responsibilities.
Moreover, as the Urbaser tribunal has observed, an investor would
only be required to bear a human right obligation if dictated by a
contract or other legal relationship. 366 Thus by creating such legal
responsibilities for investors within IIAs, investors will be more likely

to be prompted to assist states in achieving their development goals.
For the most part, states that have embraced the concept of
investor obligations have tended to take a "soft" approach. A number
of treaties include corporate social responsibility provisions that
specify that states should "encourage" enterprises to voluntarily
36 7
Some treaties
incorporate corporate social responsibility standards.
have also linked corporate social responsibility to respect for human
rights.36s
Other treaties have moved to hardening investor obligations. For
instance, the Brazil-Malawi BIT specifies that investors "shall strive

to achieve the highest possible level of contribution to the sustainable
development of the Host Party" and outlines methods by which this
responsibility can be met including stimulating social progress and
369
Similarly, the draft Pan
facilitating access of workers to training.

African Investment Code specifies that investors shall contribute to the
economic, social, and environmental progress in the host state as well
as ensure that they "do not conflict" with the state's social and
economic development. 370

365. See United Nations, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:
Implementing the United Nations 'Protect, Respect and Remedy' Framework, U.N. Doc.
HR/PUB/11/04 (2011) (ensuring the protection of human rights in business practices).
366. Urbaser v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award, ¶ 1210 (Dec. 8,
2016).
367. See, e.g., Bilateral Investment Treaty, Can.-Mong., art. 14, Sept. 8, 2016;
Argentina-Qatar BIT, supra note 309, at art. 12; Hong Kong-Chile BIT, supra note 360,
at art. 16.
368. See, e.g., Bilateral Investment Treaty Can.-Burk. Faso, art. 16, Apr. 20, 2015;
Morocco-Nigeria BIT, supra note 51, at art. 18.
369. Brazil-Malawi BIT, supra note 308, at art. 9; see also Bilateral Investment
Treaty, Braz.-Mozam., art. 10, Mar. 30, 2015.
370. Pan-African Inv. Code, Draft, E/ECA/COE/35/18, at art. 22 (2016).
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articulating a

specific provision establishing investor obligations. 371 Under this
provision, investors are required to maintain an environmental
management system, uphold human rights, act in accordance with
internationally recognized labour standards, and refrain from
managing or operating their investment in a way that circumvents the
state's international environmental, labour, and human rights
obligations. 372 In addition, they are required to engage in a social
impact assessment as well as engage in an environmental assessment
screening and assessment process for their investments, in accordance
with laws set down by either the host or home state (whichever is more
rigorous). 373 Moreover, they are required to refrain from corrupt

conduct. 3 74 Home states can further hold investors liable for any acts
relating to their investment in the host state that causes significant
damage, injuries, or loss of life. 375
The Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS)
Supplementary Act on Common Investment Rules for the Community
offers an even more elaborate system of investor obligations. 376 The act

devotes an entire chapter to establishing investor obligations. Among
others, it requires investors to strive to contribute to the development
objectives of the host state; 377 conduct environmental and social impact

assessments of the investment prior to its establishment;

3 78

refrain

from undertaking acts that breach human rights and ensure that
management and operation of the investment does not circumvent the

states' human rights, labour or environmental obligations;

379 and

refrain from engaging in corruption. 380 It further ensures that these
obligations are legally enforceable by preventing investors who have
engaged in corruption from being able to initiate any dispute
settlement procedures. 38 1 In addition, a state or a private person can
enforce the stipulated investor obligations by way of a lawsuit or the
investor's conduct can be taken into account in the event of a

dispute.3 s2
Given the importance of increasing the linkage between foreign
investment and a state's development, investor obligations should be

371. Morocco-Nigeria BIT, supra note 51, at art. 18.
372. Id.
373. Id. at art. 14.
374. Id. at art. 17.
375. Id. at art. 20.
376. See generally ECOWAS, Supplementary Act Adopting Community Rules on
Investment and the Modalities for their Implementation, ch. II, A/SA.3/12/08(2008)
(dedicating chapter to standards of treatment to member states' investors).
377. Id. at art. 11.3.
378. Id. at art. 12.
379. Id. at art. 14.2.
380. Id. at art. 13.
381. Id.
382. Id. at art. 18.
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included to foster such links. Reliance on "soft" responsibilities
"encouraging" investors to be socially responsible are unlikely to foster

such links. A better approach is to follow the United Nations Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), which stipulates
that corporations should refrain from infringing on the human rights
of others. 383 Investors could similarly be required to avoid causing or
contributing to human rights or environmental impacts. The UNGPs
further stipulate that corporations should prevent or mitigate human
rights impacts of their business by, in part, establishing a due diligence

process to account for such impacts. 384 Investors could be tasked with
similar responsibilities, requiring them to establish due diligence
processes, in accordance with international standards, that seek to
prevent, mitigate, and account for human rights and environmental

impacts of their investments.
Finally, investor obligations should specify that investors should

-

aim to contribute to a state's sustainable development. In addition, for
states particularly in need of securing development from foreign
investment, they should supply a nonexhaustive list of how this can be
achieved (i.e., by facilitating access to training, technology transfer,
etc.). Moreover, unlike the UNGPs, which are currently not legallyu,
enforceable, investor obligations in IIAs should specify that investor
failure to adhere to the prescribed conduct will either prevent an,
investor from being able to initiate an investment arbitral claim,

become the subject of a state's counterclaim, and/or result in a
proportionate reduction in the amount of any damages awarded.
Notably, the new Dutch Model BIT provides that in determining
compensation for an award, tribunals may take into account investor
noncompliance with commitments under the UN Guiding Principles on
Businesses and Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for
385
Multinational Enterprises.
B. ProceduralReform
While there is no clear separation in all instances between
substantive and procedural reform, this subpart focuses mainly on
procedural mechanisms that can enhance state efforts to promote

development goals. From the review of cases, it becomes apparent that
certain tools were either being used, or could be used, by states to
better articulate the policy space needed to regulate development goalrelated issues. These include initiating counterclaims, using scientific

383. U.N. Human Rights Council, supra note 98, § 11.
384. Id. § 15.
385. Netherlands Draft Model BIT, supra note 54, at art. 23.
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evidence, using specific experts, and using targeted development
promotion provisions.

1. Counterclaims
As mentioned earlier, state reliance on counterclaims has proved
useful in cases involving environmental or human rights issues. In
Perenco, Burlington Resources, Aven, and Urbaser, state-initiated
counterclaims highlighted the environmental issues in the first three
disputes and the issue of the right to water in the fourth. Moreover,
because the tribunal had to make a determination on the validity of
the counterclaim, it was compelled to analyze these noneconomic
issues. The initiation of the counterclaim may have therefore prompted
tribunal consideration of these noneconomic issues, which may have
been otherwise dismissed or downplayed.
Most arbitral rules allow for counterclaims,3 8 r but some tribunals
have struggled to determine whether counterclaims are within their
jurisdictions.3 8 7 States that want to ensure counterclaims are accepted
should therefore ensure that the definition of the tribunal's jurisdiction
extends to counterclaims, either by drafting a broad jurisdiction
provision 388 or by specifically making provision for consideration of
counterclaims by tribunals.3 8 9 Provision for counterclaims also creates
an avenue for tribunals to hold investors liable for any investor

obligations provided for in the treaty as these can be the subject of
counterclaims. 390

,

386. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 21.3, U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L
TRADE LAw (2014) http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules2013/UNCITRAL-Arbitration-Rules-2013-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/E95Z-YBLL] (archived
Oct. 23, 2019); Arbitration Rules, Mediation Rules, art. 5, INT'L CHAMBER OF COM.
(2017),
https://cdn.icewbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2017/01/ICC-2017-Arbitrationand-2014-Mediation-Rules-english-version.pdf.pdf
[https://perma.c/32ZA-UXQZ]
(archived Oct. 23, 2019); Arbitration Rules, art. 9(1)(iii), STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COM.
(2017); ICSID Convention, supra note 29, at art 46.
387. See, e.g., Rusoro Mining Ltd. v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/5,
Award, ¶ 627 (Aug. 22 2016) (determining jurisdiction based on the plain text of the
Treaty); Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award, 1 868, 871
(Dec. 7, 2011) (determining whether the court has jurisdiction over the case); Vestey Grp.
v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/4, Award, 1 333 (Apr. 15, 2016).
388. See Urbaser v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award, ¶ 143 (Dec. 8,
2016) (determining that the tribunal's jurisdiction was broadly defined by "[d]isputes
arising between a Party and an investor of the other Party in connection with
investments,").
389. See India Model BIT, supra note 55, at art. 14.11 (counterclaims by parties).
390. See id. at art. 14.11(i) (providing for states to bring counterclaims to enforce
investor obligations).
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2. Scientific Evidence
A second realization from the review of arbitral awards was that,
faced with scientific evidence, tribunals were more amenable to
considering noneconomic issues. Perhaps this is because scientific
evidence "provides a putatively objective basis for assessing the

391
reasonableness of state measures alleged to harm investors' rights."

For instance, in PhilipMorris, Chemtura, and Methanex, the tribunal

relied heavily on the scientific evidence provided to determine whether
the state's actions were justified. 392 Conversely, in cases such as
Windstream, the tribunal chided the state for failing to support its
39 3
and, in Metalclad, it viewed the lack
actions with scientific research,

of scientific evidence as essentially a political sham. 394 Tribunals may
be using scientific evidence, thus, as a proxy for distinguishing
legitimate state acts from spurious ones.
States intending to argue that a particular measure was taken to
protect a human right or for environmental reasons may wish,

therefore,

to consider buttressing such measures with scientific

evidence, if possible, and enacting the measure in an open and
informed process. 3 95 Moreover, for states with limited technical and
economic resources, the Philip Morris tribunal has indicated that they
could acquire scientific knowledge from evidence-based public
information. 396 In that dispute, Uruguay had relied on evidence

obtained in the course of the negotiations of the World Health
Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control rather than
conducting its own studies. 397
However, use of scientific evidence will not necessarily guarantee

a state's sovereign regulatory powers. In Bilcon, despite Canada
providing an evidentiary basis for its measure, the majority of the
tribunal still found the state violated its investment treaty

391.

Jacqueline Peel, The Use of Science in Environment-Related Investor-State

Arbitration, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENT AND INVESTMENT LAW 5 (K.

Miles ed., 2017); Marcos A. Orellana, The Role of Science in Investment Arbitrations
ConcerningPublic Health and the Environment, 17 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 48 (2006).
392. Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 143 (Aug. 2, 2010);
Methanex Corp. v. United States, UNCITRAL, Final Award (Aug. 3, 2005).
393. Windstream v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2013-22, Award, ¶ 379 (Sept. 27, 2016).
394. See, e.g., Peel, supra note 391, at 13 (arguing that the tribunal assumed that
Mexico's ecological decree "was a political sham unsupported by proper (scientific)
evidence.").
395. Methanex Corp. v. United States, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 101 (Aug. 3,
2005).
396. Philip Morris v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 393-94 (July
8, 2016).
397. Id.
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obligations. 398 In particular, it found that Canada's value of the
socioeconomic impacts of the investment on the human environment
over its scientific and technical feasibility was problematic. 399 The
Bilcon majority thus reviewed Canada's evidence through a narrow

technical lens whereas Canada had based its measure on broader
evidentiary grounds. As Peel observes, such a lens "may be too narrow
to capture the full range of impacts considered relevant by democratic
regulatory states." 4 00
3. Amicus and Independent Experts

The review of the arbitral awards also indicated that the presence
of amicus curiae in an investment dispute did not necessarily
contribute to the tribunal's consideration of human rights or

environmental issues. Indeed, in some instances, consideration of
these issues occurred without the presence of amicus and in other
tribunals continued to discount these issues despite reasoned
arguments from amicus. In part, this may be because amicus are
generally only granted limited participation rights. 401 Given this
limitation, an alternative approach may be for the tribunal to appoint
its own independent expert (selected from a state appointed list)-who
would be able to participate more fully in the dispute settlement
process-to assist the tribunal with evaluation of noneconomic issues.
Experts could, for instance, assist the tribunal with evaluating

scientific evidence, determine the socioeconomic impacts of a measure,
or help the tribunal determine whether a particular measure is
oriented towards a legitimate public welfare objective. Their role would
be thus to ensure that proper consideration is given by the tribunal to
noneconomic issues.
Several arbitral rules already provide for appointment of

independent experts. 4 02 Building on this practice, IIAs could similarly
provide that, in investment arbitrations involving public welfare

objectives, tribunals should seek the assistance of an independent
human rights or environmental expert.

398. Bilcon v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and
Liability, ¶ 534 (Mar. 17, 2015).
399. Id.
400. Peel, supra note 391, at 20.
401. See, e.g., Lucas Bastin, Amici Curiae in Investor-State Arbitration: Eight
Recent Trends, 30 ARB. INT'L 125, 137 (2017); Eugenia Levine, Amicus Curiae in
InternationalInvestment Arbitration: The Implications of an Increase in Third-Party
Participation,29 BERKELEY J. INT'L. L. 200, 207 (2011).
402. See, e.g., IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in InternationalArbitration,
INT'L BAR ASS'N, art. 6(1) (2010); Optional Rules ForArbitratingDisputes Between Two
Parties Of Which Only One Is A State, PERMANENT CT. ARB., arts. 27.1, 24.4 (1993);
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 388, at art. 27.
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4. Targeted Provisions
A final option for reform includes the addition of provisions
targeted at promoting development goals. For instance, IIAs could
contain provisions requiring investors to engage in human rights
and/or environmental impact assessments prior to investing, or they

could specify provisions that build on denial of benefits clauses-for
prevent investors from
example, as found in the NAFTA 403 -to
benefitting from the IIA if they have caused significant adverse human

rights or environmental impacts. Additionally, they could stipulate
that, in determining the compensation of an award, the tribunal must
consider whether the investor has engaged in adverse human rights
4

impacts or environmental damage. 40
Developing countries may also wish to consider negotiating for
special and differentiated treatment that would offer them more
leeway in the application of investment standards. Special and
differentiated treatment is well established under the WTO rules ,405
yet IIAs do not offer comparable treatment. As Congyan Cai notes,
BITs "leave no room for due regard for the special circumstances of host
states in prescribing a BIT obligation (in particular, a 'minimum'

standard of treatment)." 406 Inclusion of reference to special and
differentiated treatment could compel, for instance, arbitral tribunals

to consider the host state's level of development in determining
breaches of IIAs, 407 leaving more room for these states to engage in
regulatory measures aimed at promoting development goals.

Moreover, in, treaties between developed and developing
countries, states could include provisions requiring the developed state
to actively promote and facilitate investment in the developing state
and to cooperate with it "to transfer technology to and build capacity

403. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 45, at art. 113.
404. See, e.g., Ecuador's proposed model BIT which requires tribunals to consider
environmental damage as part of determining compensation for an expropriation; see
also Javier Jaramillo, New Model BIT proposed by Ecuador:Is the Cure Worse than the
2018)
20,
(July
BLOG
ARB.
KLUWER
Disease?,
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/07/20/new-model-bit-proposedecuador-cure-worse-disease/ [https://perma.cc/HP8Z-PNQQ] (archived Nov. 2, 2019)
(noting in order to quantify the compensation for the investment, the tribunal must
consider factors including the fault of the investor in the damages caused and any type
of environmental damage).
405. See, e.g., Alexander Keck & Patrick Low, Special and differential treatment
in the WTO: Why, when and how? 3 (WTO Staff Working Paper, No. ERSD-2004-03,
2004) (detailing how special and differential treatment evolved in the WTO system).
406. Cai, supra note 302, at 221.
407. Id.
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. . . [in the state] . . . to host and benefit from foreign investment." 4 08
Indeed, the idea of facilitating more interaction between the
contracting states is the practice taken in Brazilian IIAs. 409 Brazil has

adopted the approach of using joint committees (composed of state
parties) to share opportunities to expand mutual investment and to
cooperate to facilitate investment 410 and the use of ombudsmen to
support investors while in the host state. 41 1 These practices enhance
capacity building in the states as well as help states adhere to their IIA
obligations. 41 2

5. Reform of ISDS
The UNCITRAL Working Group on Investor-State Dispute
Settlement Reform, among others, have made numerous efforts to

address ISDS reform. 413 This subpart, therefore, only examines reform
of ISDS in terms of development goals.
A first observation is that, although

there has been

much

speculation that the identity characteristics of arbitrators is one of the
problems with the overall ISDS process, the reviewed awards indicate
that this is not necessarily true in relation to the promotion of
development issues. The review did not indicate, for instance, that
female arbitrators or arbitrators originating from developing countries
were more likely to take into account human rights or environmental
issues in their interpretation of investment treaties. Indeed, some of
the cases involving the greatest recognition of noneconomic interests,
such as Philip Morris or Methanex, involved male arbitrators from
developed countries. 414 Conversely, the reviewed awards did indicate a

408.

Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder

& Lise Johnson,

Commentary to the

Austrian Model Investment Treaty, 36 INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 36 (Sept. 2011),

https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/austrian_modeltreaty.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5UU-C635]
(archived Nov. 2, 2019).
409. See Henrique C. Moraes & Felipe Hees, Breaking the BIT Mold: Brazil's
PioneeringApproach to Investment Agreements, 112 AM. J. INT'L L. BLOG 197 (2018)
(noting the Brazilian investment agreement breaks the BIT mold by shifting the focus
from investment protection to facilitation).
410. See, e.g., Brazil-Malawi BIT, supra note 308, at art. 3.4.
411. Id. at art. 4.
412. Cai, supra note 302, at 221.
413. See, e.g., Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement - Note by the
Secretariat, UNCITRAL WORKING GROUP III, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.IIIWP.149
(Sept. 5 2018) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Working Group III]; David Gaukrodger,
Appointing Authorities and the Selection of Arbitrators in Investor-State Dispute
Settlement: An Overview - Consultation Paper, OECD (2018); Investment-Related
Dispute Settlement: Lessons from International Accountability Mechanisms, IISD 4
(2017), https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/investment-related-disputesettlement-iisd-auwcl-expert-meeting-washington-dc.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RMB-46J8]
(archived Nov. 2, 2019).
414. See, e.g., the all-male arbitral tribunals in Philip Morris v. Uruguay (Piero
Bernardini, Gary Born, James Crawford) and Methanex v. United States (William
Rowley, Warren Christopher and V.V. Veeder).
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trend that arbitrators with a judicial or academic background were
4 15
This trend
more likely to take into account noneconomic issues.
aligns generally with the concerns in the UNCITRAL's working group's

report

on

problems

relating

to

arbitrator's competence

and

qualifications. As the working group found, arbitrators should have the
"ability to take into account relevant issues of public interest or public
416
The
policy," which are often at stake in investment arbitrations.
reviewed awards also seemed to suggest that arbitrators from a
predominantly commercial background were less likely to engage with
public policy issues than an arbitratorwith an academic background
417
Accordingly, one ISDS
who may be more familiar with such issues.
reform option could be to increase the number of arbitrators without a
predominantly commercial background in order to promote

development goals.
Moreover, since investment arbitrationis the root cause, in many
instances of pitting investment and development issues against one
another, a second possibility for reform is to remove ISDS either in part
or wholly. One option would be, as mentioned above, to remove ISDS
as a dispute resolution mechanism for public welfare regulations
generally or for specific regulations designed to meet development
goals, such as in relation to tobacco control measures. 4 1 8 Alternatively,
states can remove ISDS entirely from their investment policies. Thus,
4 19
as have Canada and
Brazil has removed ISDS entirely from its IIAs,
the United States and Mexico for disputes between them in the newly
42 0
South Africa has
reconstituted NAFTA, now known as USMCA.

415. See, e.g., the following arbitrations where non-economic issues were
recognized: Urbaser v. Argentina (two professors on the arbitral tribunal); Philip Morris
v. Uruguay (two professors on the arbitraltribunal); Chemtura v. Canada (two professors
on the arbitral tribunal); Wirtgen v. Czech Republic (one professor and one judge on the
arbitral tribunal); LG&E v. Argentina (one professor and one judge on the arbitral
tribunal).
416. Gaukrodger, supra note 413, at ¶ 31.
417. See, e.g., Wirtgen v. Czech Republic where the arbitrator with the strictly
commercial background dissented from the recognition of non-economic issues by the
otherwise academic/judicial background tribunal. Compare also LG&E v. Argentina to
CMS v. Argentina, in which the same set of facts gave rise to two different results. In
LG&E, the arbitral tribunal with a judicial/academic background recognized the
noneconomic issues in the dispute whereas in CMS, the arbitral tribunal with the
commercial background did not.
418. See, e.g., CPTPP, supra note 45, at art. 29.5; China-Australia FTA, supra note
363, at arts. 9.11.4-9.11.6.
419. See, e.g., South Africa Dep't Trade & Industry, Bilateral Investment Treaty
Policy Framework Review, pt. II (June 2009); Brazil-Malawi BIT, supra note 308, at art.
3.
420. Agreement between the United States, the United Mexican States, and
Canada, U.S.-Mex.-Can., ch. 14, Annex 14-C (Nov. 30, 2018) https:/ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/agreementbetween [https://perma.cc/S77Y-G585] (archived Nov. 2, 2019).

62

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OFTRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 53:1

similarly eschewed ISDS, favouring instead the settlement of
investment disputes in its domestic courts and state-to-state dispute
settlement. 421 Indeed, it has abandoned reliance on IIAs entirely,
replacing them with foreign investment protection in its domestic laws,
where it limits foreign investor protection drastically. 422 Notably,
despite South Africa's departure from the BIT regime, foreign
investment has surged in the country. 42 3
In light of Brazil and South Africa's favourable experiences and
the new practice espoused in the USMCA, states may wish to review
whether the full menu of the ISDS regime is necessary. In particular,
the Brazilian approach may offer a compromise between foreign
investor protection and sovereign control over foreign investment
regulation. By removing ISDS, Brazil has prevented arbitral tribunals
from being able to engage in curtailments of the state's regulatory
power, yet it still manages to ensure foreign investors can have their
grievances and disputes settled in a specialized forum. The Brazilian

approach could therefore offer an attractive precedent for states
seeking to achieve a more balanced approach to ISDS.

VII. CONCLUSION
Since their modern inception, investment treaties have been clear
that economic development is an integral aspect of them. In today's
world, where economic development is viewed more broadly and
incorporates ideas of sustainable development as well, investment
treaties must also include notions of sustainable development within
their ambit.
While investor protection remains a key element of investment
treaties, it is questionable whether it is the ultimate aim, or simply a
means to a greater end: namely, economic and sustainable
development.
Indeed,
given
the limited
empirical
evidence
demonstrating the clear links between investment treaties and a

state's receipt of foreign direct investment as well as the renewed
power of foreign investors vis-a-vis states, it seems apparent that it is
time to retire the traditional view of investment treaties as the only
vehicles for the protection of investors/investment.

421. Protection
of
Investment
Act
No.
22
of
2015
(S.
Afr.),
https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/geisdocument/201512/39514act22f2015protectio
nofinvestmentact.pdf (last visited Jan 30, 2020) [https://perma.cc/US4C-VQA8]
(archived Nov. 2, 2019).
422. Id.
423. U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEv., Global Investment Trends Monitor No. 25 5
(Feb. 1, 2017), http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Research%20on%20FDI%20and%20TN
Cs/Global-Investment-Trends-Monitor.aspx
[https://perma.cc/YWX6-L2ER] (archived
Nov. 2, 2019).
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In particular, if investment treaties are viewed through a lens of
more than just investor protection, it is clear that such treaties should
be tools for promoting economic and sustainable development within a
state. At a minimum, they should not be vehicles thwarting such
development.
arbitration awards involving
The review of investment
noneconomic issues suggests, however, that development ideals are
being compromised in investment disputes. This is occurring because
tribunals are either failing to engage with such noneconomic issues or
discounting or ignoring these issues in their analysis. This is
surprising given that international law provides for systemic
integration, requiring tribunals to consider and take into account
noneconomic issues, insofar as they are reflected in the wider body of

the rules of international law. Indeed, while international law provides
for the consideration of these issues in the interpretation of investment
treaties, tribunals are clearly, in some instances, failing to do so.
For that reason, states should take the initiative to delineate

development goals in the text of treaties to ensure that tribunals must
consider such noneconomic issues. This can be accomplished by
inserting right-to-regulate provisions, limiting or qualifying fair and
equitable provisions, adding safeguard provisions, and delineating
investor obligations. In addition, states can add provisions enabling
counterclaims, buttress state regulations with objective evidence,
provide for independent experts with human rights or environmental
expertise, include targeted provisions aimed at promoting development
goals, and reform ISDS by specifying the qualifications of arbitrators
and by removing it as a form of dispute resolution either for
development-related provisions only or entirely.
While it is up to each individual state to determine which options
for reform best suit its investment policy goals-as some of the
is clear that
suggested options may not be optimal for every state-it
development
of
importance
the
the time is ripe for all states to realize

objectives to the overall investment regime. Failure to do so poses
increasing human rights and environmental risks for both developed
and developing countries.
Appendix 1: Investment Arbitrations Involving Human Rights and/or
Environmental Issues
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Expropriation

N

Breach

No breach found

clainmN

Damages

-
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485

Den

Award (Dec.

Guillermo

24, 2007

Aguilar
Alvarez

No breach found

No

Metalpar

Rodrigo

Social

No

S.A.

and

Oreamuno

implications of

breach

damages

Buen

Aire

Blanco,

financial crisis

found

awarded

Giorgio

Social

Breach

Sacerdoti,.

implications of

found

Argentine

V.V.

financial crisis

Republic,

Veeder,

Award,

Michell

ICSID Case

Nader

S.A. v. The

Duncan H.

Argentine

Cameron,

Republic,
Award
the

Jean Paul
on

Merits,

Chabanei
x

ICSID Case
No.
ARB/03/5 (6
Jun 2008)
Contl

Cas.

Co. v. The

No.
ARB/03/9 (5
Sept. 2008).

No breach found

USD

$2.8

million
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2020)
National

Alejandro

Social

Breach

Grid plc v.

Miguel

implications of

found

Argentine

Garro,

financial crisis

Republic,

Judd

Award,

(3

Nov. 2008)

No breach found

USD
$53,592,4
39.25

L.

Kessler,
Andres
Rigo
Sureda
Breach found

USD

Siemens

Andris

Social

Breach

A.G. v. The

Rigo

implications of

found

Argentine

Sureda,

financial crisis

Republic,

Charles N.

account of

$208,440,
on

540

Award,

Brower,

the

ICSID Case

Bello

of

value

No.

Janeiro

investmen

its

ARB/02/8

t,

(17

$9,178,00

Jan.

0

2007)
Piero

Social

Energy Int'l

Bernardin

implications of
financial crisis

El

US

Paso

Co. v. The

i

Argentine

Brigitte

Republic,

Stern

Award,

Lucius

ICSID Case

Caflisch

N

N

Breach

No breach found

USD

t

$43.03

found

million

No.
ARB/03/15
(31

Oct.

2011)
Total S.A. v.

Henri

Social

The

Alvarez

implications of

Argentine

Luis

financial crisis

Republic,

Herrera

Decision on

Marcano

Liability,

Giorgio

ICSID Case

Sacerdoti

No.
ARB/04/01
(27
2010)

Dec.

Y

N

Breach
found

No breach found

US
$269.90
million

***

